

The value of **TRUTH**

A third of the way



MARCH 2021

SIGNOS*vital***ES**

<https://www.elmundo.es/america/2013/01/08/mexico/1357679051.html>



Is a non-profit, non governmental organization that is structured by a Council built up of people with an outstanding track record, with high ethical and professional level, which have national and international recognition and with a firm commitment to democratic and freedom principles.

The Council is structured with an Executive Committee, and Advisory Committee of Specialists and a Communication Advisory Committee, and a Executive Director coordinates the operation of these three Committees.

One of the main objectives is the collection of reliable and independent information on the key variables of our economic, political and sociocultural context in order to diagnose, with a good degree of certainty, the state where the country is located.

Vital Signs intends to serve as a light to show the direction that Mexico is taking through the dissemination of quarterly reports, with a national and international scope, to alert society and the policy makers of the wide variety of problems that require special attention.



Weak or absent pulse can have many causes and represents a medical emergency. The more frequent causes are the heart attack and the shock condition. Heart attack occurs when the heart stops beating. The shock condition occurs when the organism suffers a considerable deterioration, which causes a weak pulse, fast heartbeat, shallow, breathing and loss of consciousness. It can be caused by different factors.

Vital Signs weaken and you have to be constantly taking the pulse.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 9

THE ONE-MAN GOVERNMENT 19

RULE BY DECREE 20

A WEAKENING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES
SYSTEM 23

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN DANGER AND ATTACKS ON THE INAI 28

THE JUNE 6 ELECTIONS IN QUESTION 32

IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARIZATION 35

IMPAIRMENT OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 40

THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND IMPUNITY 43

GOVERNANCE IN IMMINENT RISK 50

PUBLIC INSECURITY 51

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE
GOVERNMENTS 59

THE HEALTH TRAGEDY OF THE PANDEMIC 63

THE COST OF THE PANDEMIC 65

THE COLLAPSE OF THE HEALTH SYSTEM 76

VACCINATION PROCESS 80

THE COLLAPSE OF THE WELLBEING AND ECONOMY 85

PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL BALANCE 86

ECONOMIC PARALYSIS, AN INDUCED COMA 89

LABOR MARKET COLLAPSE AND THE HARDENING OF EXISTING
GAPS 90

FULL STOP, NO ACCESS TO A VENTILATOR 93

THE OTHER FACE OF THE CRISIS: WAGE INSTABILITY 94

OPEN-HEARTED PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 96

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FACING THE CRISIS, THE MAIN
SPECTATOR 100

LONG LIVE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S ECONOMY 105

THE SOCIAL AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS 108

MASSIVE IMPOVERISHMENT 110

SOCIAL CRISIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF MENTAL HEALTH 113

EDUCATION: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF A GENERATION 115

THE INTERRUPTION OF EDUCATION 116

EDUCATION: THE EMERGENCY WITHOUT FUNDS 117

SOCIAL EMERGENCY: DISCRIMINATION AND VULNERABILITY 120

THE PRECARIETY OF LIFE: THE INEXISTENCE OF A PREVENTION
CULTURE 121

THE REALITY OF UNPROTECTED GROUPS AND OPPORTUNITY
INEQUALITY 123

ENERGY FOLLY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 125

ABANDONMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 126

ENERGY POLITICS. A BOTTOMLESS PIT 128

CFE, NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL 132

SELF-SUPPLY PERMITS 136

IMPACTS ON INVESTMENT 138

DISPUTED RELATIONS AND BORDERS 140

THE SEARCH FOR THE VACCINE 141

FIRST ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED
STATES 145

CONCLUSIONS 152

ANNEX 154

REFERENCES 189



*A lie would have no sense
unless the truth
were felt as dangerous.*

Alfred Adler

INTRODUCTION

Truth is one of the most important values in human relationships, and it is also, sadly, one of the most denigrated, groped, and mistreated by the federal government through Mexico's president. More than two years after he started his administration and with an approval rate close to 60%¹, President López Obrador continues to make decisions that increasingly move Mexicans away from any possible and tangible recovery concerning a whole range of problems faced currently. With such a level of approval from society, it is understood that the only truth that can and should prevail in the country is that which the president dictates, provides, and places daily in the media.

¹ Available: <https://tinyurl.com/SVintro6o>

Part of this strategy to move away from any timely solution of problems is based on fragmenting or eliminating the truth and impinging citizen cooperation. Similarly, this formula implemented by the President is complemented by the fomenting and devotion to lies, half-truths, or the use of non-verifiable data, all of which are concocted every morning at press conferences that he dictates, directs and organizes. On average, according to Spin Organization, the President lies 80 times during each of his morning conferences. In two years, López Obrador is about to duplicate the seemingly unattainable 23,000 lies that *The Washington Post* accounted for Trump throughout his term. With a professional montage and an adequate battery of ad hoc questions, the country pre-

pares itself every morning to hear the same script of falsehoods, half-truths, a combination of accusations, unverifiable data, and disparaging comments against detractors, as well as the endless list of broken promises.

Behind all this montage, there is an unquestionable truth: the Mexican government has been unable to give visible and tangible results in various issues that afflict Mexican society, starting with those that are directly related to Covid-19. Some of the most notorious are the mediocre management of the pandemic and the significant shortage of medicines that have not been supplied to patients with chronic health conditions. Similarly, a myriad of issues that require immediate attention and solution are found in the box of the unreachd achievements of the federal government. Of the educational lag and the formula to improve millions of children and young people's education, absolutely nothing is mentioned. Added to this unreachd achievements box is the unseemly contempt towards women with different positions and remarks made by the President, as well as the impoverished and limited Mexican standing to face global challenges in terms of energy or climate change or the closure of hundreds of thousands of companies and the impoverishment of the population.

On average, according to Spin Organization, the President lies 80 times during each of his morning conferences.

Vital Signals' first report in 2021 presents a balance of how the country is doing more than two years after the federal administration began. An objective analysis of successes and failures is proposed. Unfortunately, it seems loaded towards setbacks due to the imposed reality beyond the effects of the pandemic. By opening this box of the federal government's unreachd achievements and presenting it to society with reliable facts and data, it will be possible to judge the way and the strategy with which the most important issues for the country's population have been handled, trying to rescue part of the lost truth.

López Obrador's government has been able to detect many of the illnesses that affect the country's vital signs. Despite the scientific, technological, and administrative deficiencies in the government, it has focused its priorities in the narrative on issues such as poverty, human rights, economic growth, the fight against corruption, improvement of health services, and many others. However, when defining lines of action, the government lacks policies that truly combat

or contain the problems holding back the country's development. Although hardly detectable, some isolated achievements have been found that have provided some benefit. An example is an increase in the minimum wage, which despite being far from satisfactory, is an adjustment that reduces the gap and encourages it to increase later.

Similarly, the activation and implementation of the USMCA has allowed Mexico to maintain its commercial hopes with at least its two neighbors in North America. One more achievement is the tangential result of some social programs implemented by 4T (Spanish acronym for "Fourth Transformation") in which economic support and some types of scholarships to different segments of the population have made it possible to avoid further economic collapse during the pandemic.

In his ambitious desire to erase any trace of previous governments in the country, the current president has been able to carry out far-reaching transformations that have frequently made the Chambers of Deputies and Senators a validator for any instruction that comes from the Executive. With this action, key institutions for Mexican democracy have been weakened, consequently reducing the catalog of individ-

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ual rights. In two years, this form of government is increasingly seen as that of a single man who makes decisions unilaterally without asking anyone for permission.

One of the main indicators that the government moves around the unique vision of the President is the frequency with which it has resorted to issuing decrees. This indicator makes it possible to implement its government program expeditiously, often illegally, characterized by an intense concentration of powers in the Federal Executive. The President has weakened the different institutional counterweights and the capacities they built over the years. The three ways identified for this institutional destruction are budget reduction, colonization of the autonomous branches' governing bodies, and the disappearance or subordination of autonomous institutions to federal government agencies.

Two years after the start of the so-called Fourth Transformation, the right to freedom of speech and the right to information have not shown improvement. The most alarming indicator is undoubtedly that of journalists' homicides. Article 19 has reported that 17 journalists have been assassinated during the current administration, six of these in 2020. During this administration, the right to information has become one of the most threatened and violated. The construction of institutions such as the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information and Data Protection (INAI) had represented an important advance for society to have access to relevant public information that will facilitate transparency and accountability. In addition to the reductions to its budget, the federal government has abused its right to reserve information that could "endanger national security," which in fact has denied information relevant to public opinion. Furthermore, this past January, the President proposed that the INAI become part of the Ministry of Public Administration (SFP) since INAI's work is costly, inefficient, and can be better carried out by the SFP (Forbes, 2021).

The upcoming elections in June 2021 are a priority for the current government. The President has wasted no time disqualifying those he considers his opponents,

including the National Electoral Institute (known as its Spanish acronym "INE"), by deploying an electoral strategy using social programs and vaccination campaigns as personal and party propaganda. The elections in 2021 represent the route to consolidate the wills and claims that the President may have in mind. Therefore, directing the federal government to this issue is an unsurprising response from the President. However, this action shows a gap in government congruence and the desired results, revealing a constant concern in maintaining the status quo of how it has been governing to date.

The one-person government has accelerated the militarization process since the beginning of his mandate. The military's relationship has set off alarms in the business and industrial sectors of the country. However, this concern has spread to the general population, where more and more, the military has been taking charge of tasks typical of civil society. This fact has already been pointed out on different occasions by various countries, including the United States. While at the moment, it is not possible to affirm definitively the country is heading towards militarism, defined as "the predominance of the military element in the government of the State," it is a fact the armed forces have accelerated and expanded their tasks,

functions, and administered budgets, and increased militarization in Mexico (Cossío 2020).²

An equally alarming component is that, in theory, the fight against corruption had been the most relevant issue in AMLO's political career. He repeated on numerous occasions that corruption was the primary evil. His presidential campaign in 2018 focused heavily on the idea of fighting corruption, and immediately after taking office as Head of the Mexican State, he declared that political corruption was over. AMLO argues daily that all evils are due to previous corruption, without proving any of his accusations. In contrast to this discourse, indicators on the perception of corruption and impunity show the persistence of these evils. The Impunity Perception Index 2020 reported that Mexico continues to be in the third of the countries that the study considers the most corrupt. Although Mexico improved four positions in the ranking, going from place 130 to 126, it is still, among the 37 members of the OECD, the country with the worst rating and is positioned next to countries such as Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Kenya (Mexican Transparency, 2021).

² Note available at: <https://tinyurl.com/SVCossio>

Concerning the health tragedy, in Mexico, we continue to experience a critical moment where the pandemic remains uncontrolled, despite the President's frequent assertions that the pandemic is already under control. The shortcomings and limitations are the common denominators. There are limited hospital beds for Covid-19 patients, according to the Network Information System (IRAG). From 11,469 beds with enabled ventilators for Covid-19 patients, only 4,002 are occupied (35%), mainly in Tlaxcala, Querétaro, and CDMX, 100%, 80%, and 78.63% of hospital occupancy. States such as Yucatán, Nuevo León, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas also report one out of every two beds is occupied for Covid-19 patients.³ The fatality rate is the 2nd highest globally, making Mexico the country with the 3rd highest total fatalities since the onset of the pandemic. There has not been a clear management strategy for the pandemic; the price of not having it has meant thousands of Mexican deaths in the country. Furthermore, many families had to sacrifice income to get oxygen concentrators or drugs, which do not guarantee life to those who use them. The poor management of the pandemic is reflected mainly in the number of deaths that have been suffered from this virus.

³ Network Information System (IRAG). Available at <https://tinyurl.com/7axrhnx>

By early 2021, Mexico was one of the first 15 countries with the highest total cases of Covid-19. It was the third country in Latin America with the total deaths per million inhabitants (1,036 deaths per million inhabitants). As recently as this past January 22, official data found that a Mexican was dying of Covid-19 every 48 seconds.

Among other problems in the health sector in Mexico, the shortage of medicines and the lack of vaccines have exposed the weaknesses of an already collapsed health system. The medicine shortage exemplifies one of the worst government decisions made, using the criterion of undoing the policies of previous administrations regardless of whether they had the expected results or not. Despite the rhetoric of the Federal Executive, vaccination is not the priority in Mexico compared to both developed and developing countries that seek to preserve the lives of their inhabitants. While contracts establish the number and suppliers of acquired doses, the date, the number of vaccines to be administered, and the logistics of the storage and application remain undefined. These decisions are influenced by the political interests of the 4T government.

Mexico has been devastated by the effects of Covid-19. The impacts have not only claimed physical lives, but have also attacked those whose well-being was already compromised.



Image: Photo EFE/Luis Torres at <https://tinyurl.com/yt82tvwp>

Mexico has been devastated by the effects of Covid-19. The impacts have not only claimed physical lives, but have also attacked those whose well-being was already compromised. SARS-CoV-2 has caused direct and indirect damage and deaths due to the health collapse associated with the pandemic and the abandonment and deterioration of primary health care. While the issue of social inequities in Mexico is not new, the pandemic's overwhelming health, economic, and social costs have caused more than 12 million people who have fallen into poverty in the pandemic's former months. Even the middle and upper classes have suffered decreases in their levels and quality of life (Vital Signals, 2020). The social rearrangement in terms of income has affected all social sectors. In that sense, increased working poverty is reported during the contingency period, going from 34.9% in February 2020 to 54.9% in May and recovering in June to 48.1%.⁴ Contrary to what the President has indicated, the economy had a dramatical fall of -8.5% in 2020, and faces a long road recovery.

⁴ Measurement of poverty, CONEVAL. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/SVcOnEvAl>

The pandemic has also had a mental health impact on millions of Mexicans. To the extent that poverty and violence have deepened, fear, worry, and stress are typical responses in moments of a crisis like the one we are experiencing. In addition to the fear of contracting the virus, there exists the impact of the changes in our daily lives to contain and stop the spread of infections. Challenging realities such as deepening poverty and unemployment, increasing rates of domestic violence, exacerbation of inequalities, physical distancing, work and education from home, anxiety to get enough food, as well as the lack of physical contact with loved ones and friends, have further deteriorated people's spirit and emotions.

One additional warning sign that has remained for several years is the country's level of governance.

One additional warning sign that has remained for several years is the country's level of governance. The degree of public insecurity, fractures to the rule of law, levels of impunity, and increasingly tense relationship between the local and federal executives seem to put the Mexican State on the verge of a true governance crisis.

As has been repeated on numerous occasions, insecurity has been considered one of the main concerns of Mexican society during the last 13 years. The significant increase in high-impact crimes committed in the country has maintained its upward trend. The confrontation between the federal Executive and some local Executives, which originated due to financial reasons, has been exacerbated by the pandemic's management and the selective attack on crime. Hence the creation of the National Action Governors Association on August 30, 2019 (López, 2019), and the Federalist Alliance on June 10, 2019, by ten governors in response to what they considered a lack of cooperation on the part of the federation in matters of public security and everything related to the fight against the pandemic (Infobae, 2020).

Education has also been left out of the pandemic's emergency context. Unfortunately, the government's actions have been limited to implementing trivial, very short-term policies, such as the closure of schools or implementing an educational band aid called "Learn at home II." Educational policy continues without having relevant resources and without a sectoral program within the distance education strategy framework that neglects a critical risk group

such as children and young people (NNJ – Spanish acronym for children and youth) who do not have access to digital media. The closure of schools and the prohibition of opening them with adequate sanitary controls like other countries of the world, has intensified educational and social problems. Education is one of the factors that most influences the advancement and progress of societies and people, and the current government has put aside this important bastion of development. This lack of immediate planning to address an uncertain future in education causes reason for concern.

In the country, vulnerable groups have remained in an environment of constant abuse, and the health condition of Covid-19 has driven its aggravations. The arrival of the virus has increased vulnerable groups' propensity or risk of economic, physical, mental, or emotional suffering without providing the necessary care to alleviate people in these conditions.

On international matters, the ability to manage a relationship that builds, edifies, and opens doors for development has not been consolidated in these two years of the current Mexican government has been in power. Although the United States' new president has sent a clear and concise message on how the main issues will be prioritized on his agenda, the Mexican president has responded with a "sovereignist" attitude, a "no one will impose rules on Mexico" position. López Obrador does not seem to understand that the scenario in which he had been successfully working with Trump has changed completely.

A loss of truth value has characterized these two years of the self-proclaimed 4T government;


due to the frequent and undisguised use of lies, half-truths, and unverifiable data on the country's situation.

For a government that aims to govern through communication and not through results and realities,

which accumulates more and more power in a single person. As Snyder said recently, "the post-truth is pre-fascism"

The origin of Vital Signals and its primary function is disseminating truthful information through verifiable facts and reliable data.





The one-man government

Image: EFE at <https://noticieros.televisa.com/historia/el-gabinete-amlo-quienes-son/>

THE ONE-MAN GOVERNMENT

The democratization processes in the world have followed different paths. The Mexican case, in particular, has served as an example of a peaceful transition based on the construction of institutions that managed to limit presidential power. The political reality of the country evolved and went from having a single party in power, false separation of powers, and the absence of guarantees for human rights, to having a plural system of competitive parties, having a clear separation of powers, and a growing acceptance of the state's role in the protection of human rights. These advances, however, could be experiencing threats that would mean a significant setback

in democratic terms. Due to the correlation of forces established after the 2018 federal elections, the current government has been able to carry out far-reaching transformations that have made parliament little more than a legitimator of the President's orders. At the same time, this has weakened institutions key to democracy and reduced the catalog of individual rights. After two years in power, the government is increasingly that of a single man capable of making decisions unilaterally, without asking anyone.

RULE BY DECREE

The first indicator is the President's decision to resort to decrees to realize his government program, characterized by a great effort to concentrate numerous federal executive powers, despite the President's party having the majority in Congress. As mentioned by academic Saúl López Noriega (2020): 2019 is the third year with the most constitutional modifications since 1917. So far, at least three agreements and decrees, nine laws, and three budgets have been challenged due to their potential unconstitutionality, in addition to thousands of appeals. There are at least 33 constitutional controversies and seven unconstitutional actions.

Due to their implications in the democratic life of the country, the following agreement and decree stand out. The presidential agreement of May 11, 2020 enabled the Armed Forces to permanently carry out public security tasks for the rest of the six-year term. This represents an intensification of militarization in the country, as it was done without clearly establishing the control, subsidiarity, complementarity, subordination, and regulation of armed corporations. Furthermore, the presidential decree published on

April 23, 2020, regarding the establishment of austerity measures taken by the government, allows the President to freely modify the destination of resources allocated to the federal government. This decree complements article 61 of the Federal Law on Budget and Treasury Responsibility (LFPRH), which allows the President to direct savings obtained as a result of the rationale for spending in the Republican Austerity Law (LAR) anywhere in the federal administration by presidential decree, without the need to justify the budgetary reorientations to the Ministry of Finance.

So far, at least three agreements and decrees, nine laws, and three budgets have been challenged due to their potential unconstitutionality, in addition to thousands of appeals.

TABLE 1: CONTROVERSIAL ACTIONS AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY LAWSUITS

| CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES | REASONS |
|---|---|
| Law on Remuneration of Public Servants | The potential violation of labor rights acquired by public officials. |
| General Education Act | Lack of clarity in the transfer of educational resources from the federation to the federated states. |
| Organic Law of Public Administration | Invasion by the federal government in capacities and powers of local governments, since authorities parallel to the state are created. |
| Federal Republican Austerity Law | For the violation of labor rights, such as the restrictions of some public officials to work in the private initiative and the reduction of wages. For invading the faculties of the Legislative Power, which is responsible for budget reallocations. |
| Budgets for 2018, 2019 and 2020 | For violating the autonomy of Autonomous Constitutional Bodies. |
| Fiscal Coordination Law | Failure by the Executive to transfer sufficient budgetary resources to the state of Michoacán to cover public spending that represents the provision of basic and normal education public services, or, where appropriate, assume said financial burden directly. |
| Agreement by which the availability zones for the country's basins and aquifers for the fiscal year 2019 are disclosed | It restricts the availability of zones, basins, and aquifers to the detriment of the Lerdo municipality, Chihuahua. |
| Fiscal Coordination Law | The lack of clarity of the law that allows the retention of federal participation to the detriment of the municipalities left without resources to face the public services under their charge is appealed. |
| Regulation on the Law of National Waters. Legislative omissions of the Congress of the Union. Omissions by the President of the Republic. | The omission of regulating, managing, and administering the water resources of the state of Chihuahua is contested, especially the water evacuation from the dam in La Boquilla as payment of the Water Treaty to the United States without previous use by the locals. |
| Failure to comply with the joint declaration on the US-Mexico initiative to fight the Covid-19 pandemic | The failure to restrict non-essential cross-border travel between Mexico and the US, the lack of public policies and sanitary controls for migrants at the border, and the lack of safe returns for migrants deported from the US are contested. |
| Failure to comply with the security measures of the World Health Organization and the Panamerican Health Organization | The lack of attention to vulnerable groups during the pandemic is contested and avoiding the power outage regardless of the lack of payment for the service by the low-income population. |

TABLE 1: CONTROVERSIAL ACTIONS AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY LAWSUITS

| CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES | REASONS |
|---|--|
| Decree that reduces fiscal times for radio and television | The National Electoral Institute (INE) raises an invasion of the competence granted by the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (CPEUM) as the sole authority in the administration of the times that correspond to the State in radio and television. |
| Militarization decree of the country issued by the president | Agreement by which the Permanent Armed Force is available to carry out Public Security tasks until 2024. |
| Against the issuance of the policy of reliability, security, continuity, and quality in the National Electric System, and the agreement to guarantee the efficiency, quality, reliability, continuity, and security of the national electricity system given the SARS-Cov 2 epidemic, issued by the National Center for Energy Control (Cenace) | The policy of reliability, security, continuity, and quality in the National Electric System, issued by the Ministry of Energy in the Official Journal of the Federation (DOF) on May 15, 2020, violates the fundamental principles of competition and free competition ordered in the CPEUM, thereby affecting its constitutional mandate and invades its sphere of competence. The policy is contrary to the content of articles 16, 28, and 133 of the Constitution and the applicable laws on electricity, which together establish a regime of competition in the generation and supply of electricity. |
| UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS | |
| National Seized Assets Law | Vices of constitutionality are indicated by discretion to exercise the Seize of assets and properties whose legitimate origin cannot be verified. |
| National Security Law | The rights to legal security, personal freedom, freedom of movement, and due process are deemed violated. The principle of the presumption of innocence. The principle of legality in its specificity aspect, the principle of minimal intervention in criminal matters, and the exceptionality of informal preventive detention. |
| National Guard Law | Because the following rights are deemed violated: legal security right, intimacy right, privacy right, personal data protection right, personal security right, personal integrity right, equality and non-discrimination right, freedom of work right, the right to hold a position or employment in the public service, and the right to rest from work. |
| National Law on the Use of Force | Legal security rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly, as well as the principle of legality and the obligation to protect and guarantee human rights, are deemed violated. |
| National Law on the Registry of Detentions | The rights to legal security, the principle of legality, the principle of immediacy in the registration of arrests, and the obligations to promote, respect, protect and guarantee human rights are deemed violated. |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), (2019) and the National Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN), (nd).

A WEAKENING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES SYSTEM

As previously reported, in its first two years, the federal government has made a systematic effort to weaken institutional checks and balances, destroy government capacities, discredit critics of the administration, and omit the protection and guarantee of human rights in public discourse. Efforts that have been, to a large extent, argued with half-truths, lies, or unverifiable data and facts.

This institutional destruction has been accomplished through 1. budget reduction, 2. colonization of the autonomous branches' governing bodies, and 3. the disappearance or subordination of autonomous institutions to federal government agencies. Since AMLO arrived in power, most of the constitutionally autonomous bodies have suffered significant budgetary cuts.

| TABLE 2: EXPENDITURE BUDGET IN REAL TERMS (BASE = JAN / 2018 *) | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|----------------|--|----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|--|
| BRANCH | 2018 | 2019 | VARIATION (CONCERNING THE PREVIOUS YEAR) | 2020 | VARIATION (CONCERNING THE LAST YEAR) | 2021 | VARIATION (CONCERNING THE PREVIOUS YEAR) |
| INE | 24,215,327,986 | 14,720,402,970 | -39.2% | 15,463,124,734 | 5.0% | 24,248,540,696 | 56.8% |
| INAI | 1,098,478,640 | 862,498,411 | 21.5% | 814,360,114 | -5.6% | 818,539,548 | 0.5% |
| FEDERAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION COMMISSION (COFEC) | 618,149,978 | 558,424,623 | -9.7% | 539,448,809 | -3.4% | 541,274,495 | 0.3% |
| IFT | 1,998,000,000 | 1,437,255,107 | -28.1% | 1,430,450,862 | -0.5% | 1,365,233,681 | -4.6% |
| NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS AND GEOGRAPHY (INEGI) | 7,788,876,174 | 11,622,318,209 | 49.2% | 15,381,548,086 | 32.3% | 7,003,467,958 | -54.5% |
| CNDH | 2,033,004,229 | 1,733,718,489 | -14.7% | 1,739,479,358 | 0.3% | 1,518,850,326 | -12.7% |
| CONEVAL | 478,709,680 | 424,599,275 | -11.3% | 421,111,869 | -0.8% | 326,375,602 | -22.5% |
| ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE | 16,243,787,465 | 14,708,947,991 | -9.4% | 15,501,541,673 | 5.4% | 15,618,905,852 | 0.8% |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the Federation Expenditure Budget (PEF) (2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021). *To deflate 2021, the PCI of Dec/2020 (the most recent available) was used.

The most exceptional cases are the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), the INAI, and the CNDH, which between 2018 and 2021 suffered reductions of 31.8%, 31.7%, 25.5%, and 25.3% respectively.

Similarly, the government has managed to colonize various governing bodies of autonomous branches. It has been documented that the president has managed to get his close allies to occupy highly relevant positions in at least the Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, and the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Some of these appointments have been challenged for inconsistencies or violations in the selection process. The most striking case was the appointment of the head of the CNDH. Simultaneously, in two years, López Obrador has dissolved eight undersecretaries, eight decentralized bodies of the federal public administration, and one autonomous constitutional body. The striking case is that of the Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS), a former decentralized body of the Ministry of Health that became part of the Undersecretariat of Prevention and Health Promotion. Moreover, the president announced on the morning of January 14, 2021, that

TABLE 3: UNDERSECRETARIES, DECENTRALIZED BODIES, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTONOMOUS BODIES DISSOLVED OR THREATENED WITH DISSOLUTION (2019-2020)

| AUTONOMOUS CONSTITUTIONAL BODY | STATUS |
|---|---|
| National Institute for the Evaluation of Education | Dissolved |
| National Institute of Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data | Active, but threatened with dissolution |
| Federal Institute of Telecommunications | Active, but threatened with dissolution |
| Federal Economic Competition Commission | Active, but threatened with dissolution |
| UNDER-SECRETARIATS | |
| Undersecretary of Communications and Technological Development | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of Tourism Planning and Policy | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of North America | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of Employment and Labor Productivity | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of Management for Environmental Protection | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of Income Treasury | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of government | Dissolved |
| Undersecretariat of Mining | Dissolved |
| CENTRALIZED BODY / PARASTATAL ENTITY | |
| Centralized body / parastatal entity | Dissolved |
| Trust Evaluation and Control Center | Dissolved |
| Federal Center for People Protection | Dissolved |
| National Planning Center | Dissolved |
| Analysis and Information for the Fight against Crime | Dissolved |
| ProMéxico | Dissolved |
| National Institute of the Entrepreneur | Dissolved |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from SFP, 2020.

more than 200 autonomous organizations would be dissolved (Gutiérrez, 2021).

Among these are the INAI, IFT, and COFECE, whose functions would be carried out by the Secretariat of the Public Function, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation and the Ministry of Economy respectively. Several of these bodies are autonomous and play a decisive role as a counterweight against the federal government.

Another decision that has resulted in the concentration of power, particularly budgetary power, was the dissolving of 109 trusts that housed almost 70 billion pesos (Approximately 3.5 billion dollars). Among these trusts are 65 funds of National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) for the allocation of scholarships, 26 funds from research centers, funds on cultural issues such as FIDECINE (trust for film making) (224 million), FONDEN (Natural Disasters Fund) (1,259 million), or related trusts for urban development such as the Metropolitan Fund (3,980 million) or development banks such as rural finance (6,861 million). This decision was a maneuver that increased the opacity in the use of public resources that, on multiple occasions, is a cause of corruption and contradicts one of the pillars of the fourth transformation.

On October 8th, 2020, the president assured that in 10 days, he would present the dossier on the misuse of money and the corruption that prevailed in trusts, even calling those who managed them thieves. As of the closing of this Report, no such dossier has been presented.



Video 1, Morning conference press
October 8 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/pae4aa4f>

Also contributing to the budgetary concentration of power is the exorbitant amount of \$807.2 billion pesos relocated by the federal Executive as budget adjustments without the need to get Congress' approval or process the modification through the Department of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) (Vital Signals, 2020). This amount represented 17% of the Executive's budget for 2019. In this way, AMLO surpassed Enrique Peña Nieto's record of budget adjustments, who in 2017 moved \$615.8 billion pesos using the same tactic, which represented 15% of the Federal Executive budget that year. In proportions not seen in decades, the federation's resources are subject to enormous margins of presidential discretion.

The opacity of public resources:

Dissolving of 109 trusts = 70 billion pesos

\$807.2 billion pesos of presidential discretion

Furthermore, one of the current government's characteristic traits has been the disqualification and confrontation with anyone who disagrees with the manner, policies, or government in general. The targets of the attacks have been journalists, civil society organizations, political competitors, government authorities and, more recently, lawyers and judges. In this last instance, there was an attack on judge Juan Pablo Gómez Fierro who granted on March 11th, 2021 a suspension of the recently enacted Electricity Industry Act, which had been introduced by the President. The verbal complaint in the mañana was followed by an official letter to the president of the Judiciary Council, chaired by the President of the Supreme Court.



Video 2, Morning conference press
March 15 2021, <https://tinyurl.com/2hzveudd>



Image: Judge Juan Pablo Fierro notified nine resources to stop the Electric Law. Special / El Diario at <https://eldiariodecoahuila.com.mx/2021/03/23/otorga-9-recursos-para-frenar-ley/>

In the letter president López Obrador asked for an investigation on the judge for alleged corruption, and made a reference to other presumed wrong doers, like the Spanish energy company Iberdrola, Claudio X. González (from an NGO) and former minister of the Supreme Court, José Ramón Cossío, accusing them of complicity and corruption without any evidence. The President of the Judiciary Council, institution that oversees the judiciary process and judges behavior, responded to the president's request that the corresponding body would look into the matter and decide whether there were sufficient evidence to open an investigation. This fact represents an act of public pressure from the head of the Executive to the Judicial Power on what seems to be political persecution. Although there is no room for speculation on this matter, the simple fact that the Head of State of Mexico accused publicly and asked for an investigation of a judge that ruled against the president's will on a flagship policy, implies a potential threat to the independence of the Judicial Power with grave implications on democracy.

The organizations in organized civil society and journalism that have received the most attacks from the president are the association Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad and the newspaper Reforma,

with at least 100 and 41 respectively. Once again, the president disqualifies and attacks whoever disagrees with him, his government, and his project.



Video 3, Morning conference press September 24 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/p3cy5w4>



Image: research developed by Mexicans against Corruption and Impunity, at <https://contralacorrupcion.mx/la-corrupcion-de-ahora/>

Image: September 12, 2020 *Reforma* newspaper called "filthy pasquin" by President López Obrador.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN DANGER AND ATTACKS ON THE INAI

Two years after the start of the so-called Fourth Transformation, freedom of speech rights and the right to information have not shown improvement. The most alarming indicator is undoubtedly the one relative to journalist homicides. Article 19 has reported that 17 journalists have been assassinated during the current administration, six of these in 2020. Regarding justice for journalists, only four sentences were registered in 2019 and seven in 2020 following investigations carried out by the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes committed against Freedom of Speech (FEADLE). Two of these sentences were for homicide, two for threats, two for abuse of authority, one for illegal deprivation of liberty, one for torture, one for injuries, one for robbery, and one for actions against the administration of justice.

In 2019 and 2020, FEADLE has carried out 224 investigations for crimes against journalists. The inquiries registered in 2020 (120) experienced an increase of 39.5% compared to those registered in 2018, the previous administration's last year. The most frequent crimes in the 2019 and 2020 investigations are 149 threats, 20 injuries, and 12 cases of abuse of authority.

TABLE 4: TOTAL INVESTIGATION FILES FOR CRIMES AGAINST JOURNALISTS

| OFFENSE TYPE | FREQUENCY IN 2019 | FREQUENCY IN 2020 | TOTAL FREQUENCY |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Abuse of authority | 8 | 4 | 12 |
| Illegal access to computer systems and equipment | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| Trespassing | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Threats | 65 | 84 | 149 |
| Against justice administration | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Property damage | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Organized Crime | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Homicide | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Interception of communication | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Injuries | 8 | 12 | 20 |
| Drug dealing | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Unlawful deprivation of liberty | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| Divulgence of secrets | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Theft | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Attempted murder | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Usurpation of functions | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 104 | 120 | 224 |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the Secretariat of the Civil Service SFP, (2020).

The right to information has become in this government one of the most threatened and violated. Although Mexicans have never fully exercised this right, the construction of institutions such as INAI had represented an important advance for society to have access to relevant public information that facilitates transparency and accountability. In contrast, on January 7, 2021, the president of Mexico reported during his morning conference that he would meet with his cabinet to make a reform proposal that would convert the constitutionally autonomous bodies into bodies belonging to the federal secretariats (Forbes, 2021). Specifically, he commented that the INAI would become part of the Public Function Secretariat (SFP) since this institute's work is costly, inefficient, and the SFP can better achieve it.

The president's claim does not seem to hold up. Although INAI has received substantial budgets since its creation, it is also true that it has served as a counterweight to public power, specifically the federal Executive Power which has been characterized by not protecting or guaranteeing the right of access to information to people. Besides, as already shown, its budget is 25.1% lower in 2021 than it was in 2018.




Image: El Universal. Photo: Berenice Fregoso at <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/quien-es-blanca-lilia-ibarra-cadena-la-nueva-presidenta-del-inai>.

The appeals review presented to the INAI observed that since 2017, on no occasion has this institute confirmed any of the obligated subject resolutions.⁵ In other words, in all events for which information applicants have filed appeals for review, it has been corroborated that the obligated subjects (mainly federal government agencies) have violated the right to access public information, a clear example of the opacity with which federal agencies carry themselves.

On the other hand, the SFP performance in terms of transparency has been very poor. From 2017 to 2020, this agency accumulated 265 review appeals, and it was found that every one of them violated the citizens' right to information.

⁵ The resolutions issued by the INAI can be given in three ways: reject, revoke/modify and confirm. The fact that a resolution is confirmed by the institute itself means that the bound subject did fully guarantee the citizen's right to information. In the opposite sense, if the resolution is modified or revoked, there is some point that the bound subject forgot to protect. In the case of revocation, the entire resolution loses validity; if it is modified, it only loses validity in some aspect. The INAI introduces in its database the concept "orders", that is, it not only grants the individual the reason, but also instructs the subject bound to act in a certain way.

TABLE 5: SENSE OF RESOLUTIONS

| YEAR | MODIFY | ORDER | REVOKES | TOTAL |
|------|--------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2017 | 2,200 | 16 | 872 | 3,088 |
| 2018 | 2,155 | 45 | 941 | 3,141 |
| 2019 | 3,445 | 296 | 1,951 | 5,692 |
| 2020 | 1,533 | 111 | 1,263 | 2,907 |

Source: Puebla against Corruption and Impunity with data from the National Institute of Transparency and Access to Public Information, (2020).

TABLE 6: SECRETARIAT OF THE PUBLIC FUNCTION-DIRECTION RESOLUTIONS

| YEAR | MODIFY | ORDER | REVOKES | GRAN TOTAL |
|---|--------|-------|---------|------------|
| 2017 | 48 | | 8 | 56 |
| 2018 | 47 | 1 | 12 | 60 |
| 2019 | 66 | 1 | 27 | 94 |
| 2020 | 30 | | 25 | 55 |
| TOTAL OF REVIEWED APPEALS IN WHICH CITIZENS' RIGHT TO INFORMATION HAS BEEN VIOLATED | | | | 265 |

Source: Puebla against Corruption and Impunity with data from the National Institute of Transparency and Access to Public Information, (2020).

It should be noted that the amount assigned by the current government for official advertising is less than in the previous six-year terms. Specifically, in two years, the López Obrador government has spent \$3.9 billion pesos. Only in his first year, Felipe Calderón spent \$7.4 billion pesos and Peña Nieto \$9.6 billion (247% compared to AMLO in two years). Despite this notable decrease, the distribution of these resources still does not have clear and transparent criteria, and the majority is concentrated in a few media outlets. In 2020, federal government agencies reported having spent 654 million pesos for official advertising, but only three media concentrated \$432 million pesos, 66% of the total exercised. Since 2019, Televisa, La Jornada, and TV Azteca are the three most favored media outlets.

TABLE 7: OFFICIAL ADVERTISING (JANUARY-OCTOBER 2020)

| MEDIA | AMOUNT ALLOCATED |
|---|------------------|
| Estudios Azteca | 73,352,502 |
| Televisa | 71,222,484 |
| <i>La Jornada</i> | 46,145,332 |
| Radio Fórmula | 26,349,114 |
| Editorial Acuario Organization | 11,618,485 |
| <i>Excélsior</i> | 10,802,393 |
| <i>Milenio</i> | 7,945,647 |
| <i>El Universal</i> | 7,090,188 |
| Centro Cultural Nuestra América | 6,922,503 |
| Edición y Publicidad de Medios de los Estados | 6,648,887 |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the Ministry of Public Function, (2021).

Expenditure in advertising

| | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Calderón Hinojosa</i> | <i>\$7.4 billion pesos</i> | <i>in 1 year</i> |
| <i>Peña Nieto</i> | <i>\$9.6 billion pesos</i> | <i>in 1 year</i> |
| <i>López Obrador</i> | <i>\$3.9 billion pesos*</i> | <i>in 2 years</i> |

* Costs of daily morning conferences, use of digital social media nor *Regeneración* newspaper are not here considered.

THE JUNE 6 ELECTIONS IN QUESTION

Governments in power have traditionally used election times to promote achievements and condition benefits. Although as an opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador strongly criticized the electoral treatment of social programs and the direct and indirect proselytism of officials during the campaigns, he has resorted these same tactics as president, except this time in a context of unparalleled health and economic crisis. The president has invested time in disqualifying those he considers his opponents, including the INE, and has deployed an electoral strategy that uses social programs and vaccination campaigns as personal propaganda.

Similar to parts of organized civil society, political opponents have also been subject to presidential disqualifications. The paradigmatic case has been Felipe Calderón, who has deserved 281 negative mentions in the morning conferences. The authority that has been criticized the most by AMLO is the National Electoral Institute (INE), which on at least 27 occasions has been the target of discrediting comments by the Federal Executive during his morning conferences.

Although the enmity between López Obrador and the administrative, electoral authority is not new, AMLO's position aggravates his discrediting comments.

The INE agreed the president must suspend the broadcast of morning conferences during the electoral period since this exercise is considered propaganda (Article 41, section C of the Constitution of Mexico prohibits government propaganda during Election times). López Obrador petitioned the respective judicial bodies, specifically the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF), to appeal INE's decision, which he said constitutes censorship and a violation of the freedom of speech and right to information of the Mexican people (Forbes, 2021). On February 18, 2021, the TEPJF resolved to reverse the INE agreement, considering it excessive. It is worth mentioning AMLO himself commented on May 28, 2019, that he agreed that the national broadcast of his morning conferences be suspended when there were electoral processes, a statement that he dismissed on September 2, 2020.



Video 4, Morning press conference May 28, 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/h62fb8>



Video 5, Morning press conference September 2 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/u848up5t>



Image: Magistrate José Luis Vargas of TEPJF. Photo: TEPJF at <https://lopezdoriga.com/nacional/pide-arturo-zaldivar-que-presidente-de-tepjf-acuda-ante-autoridades-por-senalamientos-sobre-patrimonio/>

Complementary to the attacks against the INE, and as occurred in previous administrations, it has been observed that Mexico's government has added an electoral component to the distribution of social programs. The clearest example is the construction of beneficiary registries that are not public and that were created by 22,914 "servants of the nation". It should be noted that the members of this government body identified themselves with vests that included the image of the president, which meant that in 2019 the INE considered it propaganda and ordered a change of this clothing.

Another growing concern in public opinion is the opportunistic use of the vaccination process from political-electoral purposes. Despite Mexico having extensive experience in immunization campaigns, so much so that the Mexican State has managed to vaccinate around 11 million people in a month, the current government decided to forgo the proven infrastructure and human resources to instead resort to the well-being census, which has not been made transparent and whose criteria seem to respond to electoral interests. The composition of the vaccination brigades is unusual; many of them will be made up of 4 elements of the Armed Forces or National Guard, two

members of health personnel (a doctor and a nurse), a representative of the Sembrando Vidas program, a member of the health sector, two volunteers (The School is Ours or Young People Building the Future) and three servants of the nation, one of which will coordinate the entire brigade. In other words, of the 13 members of each “Roadrunner Brigade”, only two are trained to vaccinate.



Image: “An official takes a photograph of a woman who was vaccinated against Covid in Mexico City”. NAYELI CRUZ” at <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-02-18/soldados-militantes-y-voluntarios-los-polemicos-guardianes-de-la-vacuna-contra-la-Covid-19-en-mexico.html>

Image: Reuters at <https://www.marca.com/claro-mx/trending/coronavirus/2021/01/13/5fff2109268e3e09278b45e7.html>



IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARIZATION

The López Obrador government has accelerated the militarization process since the beginning of his term. Since August 24, 2018, already as president-elect of Mexico and after a meeting with the then secretaries of Defense and the Navy, AMLO began to clarify his longstanding narrative on returning the military to their barracks. This position has been maintained with different arguments.



Video 6, Morning press conference
July 29, 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/6mazcu8n>

After the consultation held from October 25-28, 2018, to decide the cancellation of the New Mexico City International Airport (NAIM), López Obrador announced that it would be the Army that would build the Felipe Ángeles Airport, which was later joined by three more airports and the Mayan Train. In 2019, a decree was issued creating the National Guard (GN), a civilian corporation, but 80% of its members are military. Additionally, it has been documented that the



Image: “Militarization: gross mistake” Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, at center, besides the Secretary of Defense Luis Crescencio Sandoval, and Army Secretary, Vidal Francisco Soberón, in a militar vehicle during at a parade on Independence Day at el Zócalo, the main square, Mexico City. © 2019 AP Photo/Marco Ugarte at <https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2020/08/03/militarizacion-craso-error>

GN receives orders from the Armed Forces, which are responsible, among other things, for the construction of the GN barracks.

The creation of the GN implied a set of critical normative transformations that included the creation of the Law of the National Guard and the reforms of the National Law of the Registry of Detentions, the General Law of the National Public Security System, the General Law of the System National Public Security and the National Law on the Use of Force. All these modifications were published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on May 27, 2019. This step represented an enormous advance on the path towards the militarization of public security, which was consolidated with the May 11, 2020 agreement, which enabled the armed forces to carry out public security tasks until March 27, 2024. This was justified by the argument that strengthening the GN would take time and that the military corporations would be the only ones capable of addressing insecurity.

In a complementary way, the president increased the responsibilities and resources of the Army and Navy, making them his main allies. The budgets of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and Marine Secretary (SEMAR) have been increasing. In 2019, the resources approved for the armed forces

were equivalent to \$125.7 billion pesos; for 2020, they amounted to \$127.6 billion pesos, and for 2021 they reached \$148 billion pesos, the highest amount that has been approved for the military. The actual increase between 2019 and 2021 was 11.08%, more than inflation. In 2019, the budget of the armed forces experienced a net modification of \$19.9 billion pesos so that the total exercise of these institutions in that year was \$145.6 billion pesos, an amount significantly higher than that approved in Congress for that period.⁶

⁶ The Budget Office reported that in 2019 the Minister of Defense had a positive addition to its budget of 17.9 billion pesos, and the Navy had an increase of 1.9 billion pesos.

The budgets of SEDENA Y SEMAR:

| | |
|------------------|--|
| <i>2019</i> | <i>\$125.7 billion pesos</i> |
| <i>2020</i> | <i>\$127.6 billion pesos</i> |
| <i>2021</i> | <i>\$148 billion pesos</i> |
| <i>2019–2021</i> | <i>was 11.08%, more than inflation</i> |

This increase is explained, in part, by the number of tasks that this government has entrusted to military corporations. There are at least 43 new tasks that the army forces must carry out, all previously conducted by civilians. Among those that stand out for their extreme disconnection with functions related to national defense are constructing bank branches of the Banco del Bienestar, the construction of a civilian airport, the distribution of social programs, and the

Images:

Construction of Santa Lucía's airport:

<https://tinyurl.com/bxbsxf6z>

Planting life:

<https://tinyurl.com/2xcaakzh>

Giving benefits of social programs:

<https://tinyurl.com/zju9kemf>

Ports control:

<https://tinyurl.com/m66yhocr>

Construction of Maya Train:

<https://tinyurl.com/yssfme4f>

Covid-19 vaccination:

<https://tinyurl.com/9n77r6dz>

Construction of Bienestar banks:

<https://tinyurl.com/2utdb555>

Stopping migrants at Northern and Southern borders:

<https://tinyurl.com/6pzynanv>




construction of the Mayan Train.

An additional element in this area has been the influence of the military apparatus in civilian decisions. The Causa en Común organization identified that between 2018 and 2020, there have been 78 military elements occupying civilian positions in all levels of government, so it is presumed that the army corporations have influenced decisions in the realms of national defense and public security. As can be seen, the increasing inclusion of the Armed Forces in tasks outside their constitutional responsibilities has required political decisions and legal modifications that will be difficult to reverse in the future. It should not be forgotten that, while presenting the need to strengthen the local police, the federal authorities of three different administrations have promised that the militarization of public security, which began visibly in 2007, would not last long. In contrast, it is observed that militarization has been ongoing for at least 14 years, and a transition towards a civil security policy is not yet expected. On the contrary, as the tasks, budgets, and powers for the armed forces increase, the country is getting closer and closer to a militaristic regime in which the armed forces could influence the country's political decisions.



Image: “Military policeman with the batch of the new National Guard stop migrants from Guatemala to avoid them cross Río Bravo from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico to El Paso, Texas, on Monday June 24, 2019.” (AP Photo/Christian Chavez) at <https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/amlo-control-migrantes-concentra-frontera-155403202.html>.

**MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE
BASED ON TABLE 8 (ANNEX)**



Source: In-house elaboration with information from Common Cause, (2020).

IMPAIRMENT OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Although the human rights situation in Mexico has been widely criticized throughout the 21st century, the rights that were previously taken for granted have been reduced during the last two years. The reforms of the National Law on Seized Assets (LNED), the National Law on the Use of Force (LNSUF), the General Law of the National Public Security System (LGSNSP) and the National Law of the Registry of Detentions (LNRD), as well as the issuance of the National Guard Law (LGN) violate, altogether, 25 fundamental rights as well as various constitutional and conventional provisions (Table 9).

The reform of the National Code of Criminal Procedures expanded the crimes that deserve preventive detention, among which are: the use of toy weapons to commit a crime, electoral crimes, and the interruption of the construction of railways. The 2019 fiscal penal reform established that illicit acts against the treasury will be considered a threat to national security. Also, informal preventive detention was established for the crimes of fiscal smuggling and comparable fiscal fraud when the amount is higher

than \$7,804,230 pesos (Chamber of Deputies of the H. Congress of the Union, 2014). It seems that this expansion of crimes with informal preventive detention is aimed at avoiding the interruption of the administration's macro-projects, such as the Mayan Train, and to guarantee the tax collection that the government considers necessary to carry out its major projects.

The rights that were previously taken for granted have been reduced during the last two years. The reforms of the National Law violate, altogether, 25 fundamental rights.

TABLE 9: RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND PRINCIPLES VIOLATED BY THE LNSUF, THE LNRD, THE LGSNSP, AND THE LGN

| LAW | VIOLATED RIGHTS | CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONVENTIONAL PROVISIONS VIOLATED |
|--|--|--|
| National Law on Seized Assets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » The right to legal security » Access to public information right. » Property right. » Protection of personal data right. » Effective judicial protection right. » Due process. » Legality principle. » Maximum publicity principle. » Non-retroactivity of law Principle. » Constitutional Supremacy Principle. » The obligation of the State to respect and protect human rights. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Political Constitution of Mexico: Artículos 6, 14, 16, 22, 27. » International Treaties: American Convention on Human Rights: Articles 1, 2, 9, 13, and 21. » International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Articles 2, 15 and 19. |
| National Law on the Use of Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Legal security right. » Freedom of speech. » Freedom of Assembly » Legality principle. » Obligation to protect and guarantee human rights. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Political Constitution of Mexico » Articles 1, 6, 9, 14, 16 and transitory fourth, section III, numerals 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the reform of March 26, 2019. » International Treaties: » American Convention on Human Rights: Articles 9, 13, and 15 » International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Articles 19 and 21. |
| National Law on the Registry of Detentions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Legal security right. » Legality principle. » Principle of immediacy in the registration of arrests. » Obligation to promote, respect, protect, and guarantee human rights. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Political Constitution of Mexico: » Articles 1, 14, 16, and the Fourth Transitory Article, section IV, numeral 7 of the Decree dated March 26, 2019, by which the CPEUM was amended. » International Treaties: » American Convention on Human Rights: Articles 1, 2, and 9. » International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 2. |

TABLE 9: RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND PRINCIPLES VIOLATED BY THE LNSUF, THE LNRD, THE LGSNSP, AND THE LGN

| LEY | VIOLATED RIGHTS | CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONVENTIONAL PROVISIONS VIOLATED |
|--|--|---|
| General Law of the National Public Security System | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Access to public information right. » Maximum publicity principle. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Political Constitution of Mexico: » Articles 1º and 6º. » International Treaties: » American Convention on Human Rights: Articles 1, 2 y 13 » International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Articles 2 and 19 |
| National Guard Law | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Legal security right. » Right to intimacy. » The right to privacy. » Protection of personal data right. » Right to personal security. » Right to personal integrity. » Right to equality and non-discrimination. » Right to freedom of work. » Right to hold a position or job in the public service. » Right to rest from work. » Legality principle. » Principle of strictness. » The principle of the presumption of innocence. » Principle of social reintegration. » Prohibition of arbitrary interference. » Obligation to respect, promote and protect human rights. » Obligation to punish torture and forced disappearance given its seriousness. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Political Constitution of Mexico: » Articles 1, 5, 11, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21 and 35, section VI. » International Treaties: » American Convention on Human Rights: Articles 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 22, and 24. » International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Articles: 2, 9, 10, 17 and 26 » Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Articles 1 and 4. » Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture: Articles 2 and 6. » Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons: Article III. » International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance: Articles 4 and 7. |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the LNEP, (2019), National Law on the Use of Force (LNUF), (2019), LNRD, (2019), LGSNSP, (2009), LGN, (2019), Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, (1917), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), American Convention on Human Rights, (1969), Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, (1985), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (1984), Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, (1994) and International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance, (2006).

THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND IMPUNITY

Corruption has been the most relevant topic in López Obrador's political career. Years before and during his presidential campaign in 2018, he positioned himself as someone who could end corruption. Already as head of state, he affirmed that he had exiled it without offering evidence.



Video 7, Morning press conference
November 18, 2019,
<https://tinyurl.com/tpzau5bs>

However, the indicators on the perception of corruption and impunity show its persistence. The Impunity Perception Index 2020 reported that Mexico continues to be in the third of the countries that the study considers the most corrupt. Although Mexico improved four positions in the ranking, going from 130th to 126th place, it is still the country with the worst rating among the 37 members of the OECD and is positioned next to countries such as Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Kenya (Mexican Transparency, 2021).

The results regarding impunity are not very encouraging either. The Global Impunity Index Mexico 2020 (igi-2020) places the country in 60th place out of 69 countries, where the 1st place is the country with the least impunity and the 69th is that with the most impunity. Mexico is the 9th worst rated after Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Guyana, Paraguay, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Morocco, Honduras, and Thailand (La Clercq and Rodríguez, 2020). Although the Attorney General's Office inauguration was extensively advertised, which in formal terms meant its autonomy and independence from the Executive Power, its performance has left much to be desired in cases of great national relevance. One of the most representative examples was the almost immediate exoneration of the General and former Secretary of National Defense, Salvador Cienfuegos, who was investigated and detained in the United States. However, after pressure from the Mexican government, he was returned to Mexico under a collaboration agreement between the Attorney General of Mexico (FGR) and the US Department of Justice, which was violated by the Mexican government (Silbiger, 2021). The Lozoya case for the Odebrecht corruption issue has been also been

characterized by a special treatment of the accused and Rosario Robles, where the FGR's actions have been rather strict, even denying the benefits given to Lozoya.

More evidence is found in the number of direct awards carried out under the current government. It was established that government work contracts would be carried out through public tenders and citizens and UN observers' participation in the 50 guidelines made by López Obrador after the 2018 elections (Regeneración, 2018) in the 2019 National Development Plan. Once again, the government changed and justified its position without providing documents, data, or verifiable information to prove its arguments:



Video 8, morning press conference
April 29, 2019,
<https://tinyurl.com/53u4jr5n>

The Tecnológico de Monterrey (2021) announced that only in 2019, the Federal Public Administration (APF) directly assigned 40.7% of the total amount reported in the CompraNet platform, which is equivalent to \$129.9 billion pesos. This data represented an

Mexico is still the country with the worst rating among the 37 members of the OECD and is positioned in 60th place out of 69 countries, where the 1st place is the country with the least impunity.



Image: "Mexico leads the list of countries in America with highest impunity index: IGI-2020" at <https://www.la-prensa.com.mx/mexico/mexico-encabeza-lista-de-paises-de-america-con-mas-alto-indice-de-impunidad-igi-2020-5645664.html>

increase of 11.1% compared to 2017 and 4.6% compared to 2018. By 2020, the direct awards made by the APF reached the figure of \$194.4 billion pesos, which represents 42.2% of the total contracts carried out by the APF that year. It is worth mentioning that the study above shows that under the concept of "other works," the government of Mexico has committed almost \$75 billion pesos in two years.

Finally, the persecution and selective application of justice seem to remain in this government. While the government has widely advertised cases such as that of Emilio Lozoya or Rosario Robles, other alleged corruption cases of individuals who belong to the current federal government or who are related to it have remained without investigation. Some cases that have widely documented the press (yet not by the competent authority) stand out, such as Manuel Bartlett, director of the Federal Electricity Commission. He was accused of being linked to 25 properties with a value close to \$800 million pesos. Although the Ministry of Public Function opened an unconvincing investigation, the official went unpunished with the argument that since the properties are in his partner's name and she is not his wife, he is not required to be transparent with her assets. Another case documented by the press that stands out was that of the current Secretary of the Interior, Olga Sánchez Cordero, who, despite the promise made by AMLO about making all the wealth and properties of the officials transparent, did not declare a penthouse with a cost of approximately \$11 million pesos, located in the city of Houston, Texas.



Image: “SFP defends direct allocations; “they are not illegal nor immoral”, states head” at <https://www.milenio.com/politica/irma-erendira-sandoval-defiende-adjudicaciones-compra-medicamento>

TABLE 10: ALLEGED CASES OF CORRUPTION THAT REMAIN UNPUNISHED



| OFFICIAL | POSITION | CASE | EVENTS | IMPUNITY PROCESS | THE ALLEGED LEGAL BASIS THAT IS CONSIDERED VIOLATED |
|--|---|--|--|--|---|
| <p>MANUEL BARTLETT DÍAZ</p>  <p>Image: https://tinyurl.com/rbbd-6ypu</p> | Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) Director | Irregularities in the declaration of assets. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » It was accused that Bartlett's fortune was 16 times greater than the \$51 million pesos he declared when entering CFE. » With a real estate empire of 25 properties with an approximate value of \$800 million pesos (reported in the name of his relatives) and 12 companies. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Bartlett denied the accusation » AMLO came to his defense, assuring that this type of journalistic report seeks to affect the changes that his government is undertaking and that it was all a conspiracy of dark interests. » Irma Erendira Sandoval, secretary of the Civil Service (FP), ruled that the official was innocent. » The SFP exonerated Bartlett and concluded that he does not have more properties than he has declared and that he has no interference as the owner of the properties, neither of its children nor its partner. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Hidden enrichment. » Concealment of conflict of interest. » Influence peddling. |
| <p>ANA GABRIELA GUEVARA</p>  <p>Image: https://tinyurl.com/3p-dk9rw9</p> | Director of The National Commission of Physical Culture and Sports (CONADE) | Irregularities in the use of the High-Performance Sports Trust Fund (Fodepar) and bidding conflict with the company Cimsa. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » An audit by SFP found irregularities in the allocation and verification of \$50.8 million pesos from the Trust Fund for High-Performance Sports (Fodepar). » The director was reported to the FGR for alleged extortion, fraud, and asking for bribes from the Cimsa company to directly assign the contract for "Food Supplies for Athletes and Trainers." | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » SFP launched an investigation against Ana Guevara. » After the denouncing, the businessmen suffered an attack with firearms in Boca del Río and filed another complaint about attempted homicide. » The businessmen who denounced her for alleged extortion were arrested in Boca del Río for alleged participation in a forced disappearance of a police officer who allegedly participated in the request for "cumshaw" from Cimsa. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Attempted murder » Extortion, threats, and bribery. » Ratification of attempted murder. » Corruption before the SFP. » Tax Evasion. |

TABLE 10: ALLEGED CASES OF CORRUPTION THAT REMAIN UNPUNISHED





| OFFICIAL | POSITION | CASE | EVENTS | IMPUNITY PROCESS | THE ALLEGED LEGAL BASIS THAT IS CONSIDERED VIOLATED |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| IRMA ERÉNDIRA SANDOVAL  <i>Image: https://tinyurl.com/e7creavd</i> | Head of the Ministry of Public Function | Presumed value of properties for 60 million pesos | » An investigation by Latinus declared that the official accumulates properties in her family circle around \$60 million pesos, which were not disclosed. | » Irma Eréndira Sandoval responded with insults and an official statement from the SFP, in which it is accepted that she received a piece of land from the government. She argues that it was an act of justice for a long-standing housing struggle led by her father, even though the law expressly prohibits the delivery of public goods for the benefit of an individual. Regarding the other five properties, they accepted that they acquired them in just nine years but with academic salaries and family aid, and a prize they received. | » Hidden enrichment. » Illegal use of attributes and faculties. |
| OLGA SÁNCHEZ CORDERO  <i>Image: https://tinyurl.com/3xt6uet7</i> | Ministry of the Interior | Irregularities in wealth declaration: Penthouse in Houston | » Olga Sánchez Cordero omitted to report an \$11 million pesos department in Houston in the patrimonial declaration. | » The official held the SFP responsible for withholding information of a property and asked for clarification. » • The SFP denied the accusation and clarified that all the properties owned by federal officials would not appear publicly, not to affect third parties. » • Sánchez Cordero clarified that the penthouse is “the result of 100 years of work.” | » Concealment of conflict of interest. |

TABLE 10: ALLEGED CASES OF CORRUPTION THAT REMAIN UNPUNISHED

| OFFICIAL | POSITION | CASE | EVENTS | IMPUNITY PROCESS | THE ALLEGED LEGAL BASIS THAT IS CONSIDERED VIOLATED |
|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| JAVIER JIMÉNEZ ESPRIÚ  <i>Image: https://tinyurl.com/45878rfe</i> | Former Secretary of Communications and Transportation | Connection with a company linked to Odebrecht and irregularities in the declaration of assets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Meade accuses Jiménez Espriú of links with Odebrecht. » As Secretary of Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT), he was accused of alleged omission of a condominium of at least \$6.6. million pesos in the United States. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » “No estamos obligados a explicarle nada a nadie con respecto al patrimonio privado que alcanzamos a construir con un gran esfuerzo”. » No explicó, ni transparentó como se esperaba de alguien en su cargo, ni se mostró abierta a una investigación independiente sobre el origen y valor real de su patrimonio. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Alleged acts of corruption. » Conflict of interests. » Omissions. |
| ALFONSO ROMO  <i>Image: https://tinyurl.com/guurabf3</i> | Former Head of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic | The exploitation of water with severe ecological damage in Yucatan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » A journalistic investigation shows that Romo’s company, Enerrall, obtained concessions to exploit the largest amount of groundwater for agricultural use in the Yucatan Peninsula and has caused ecological damage in the area or The company uses the aquifer with the most important reserve in the country, but whose average annual availability has dropped 43%. During its expansion, it has affected vegetation and fauna without knowing how it complies with environmental mitigation measures, in addition to destroying a cenote. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Romo assured that he no longer has a stake in said company and confirmed that he has 0.4% of the water permits in the region. » The official bragged about obtaining recognition for his ecological work and technological development in the field of soils. » The investigation of the case resulted in a fine and without the file being sent for a criminal investigation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Non-compliance with environmental mitigation measures. |

Source: In house elaboration with data on: - Manuel Barlett: Loret de Mola (2020), González (2020), Infobae (2020), CNN Español (2019), Zuckermann (2020); Ana Gabriela Guevara: El Universal (2020), Half Time (2020), Gómez (2020), Infobae (2020); Irma Erendira Sandoval: Maldonado (2020), RRC (2018), Loret de Mola (2020); Olga Sánchez Cordero: The Broken Chair (2019), The Sun of Mexico (2019), Process (2019), Reform (2019); Jiménez Espriú: Expansión (2018), Muñoz & Urrutia (2020), El Mundo (2018), Salgado (2018); Alfonso Romo: Navarro (2020), Caelín, Melgoza & Rincón (2020).



Governance in imminent risk



<https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/mexico/sociedad/informe-de-mentiras-en-varios-puntos-del-pais-marcan-en-contra-de-amlo-informe-de-gobierno-4121280.html>

GOVERNANCE

IN IMMINENT RISK

Governance can be understood as the full exercise of political power by the State to solve social demands in an effective, permanent and legitimate way. In this sense, a governance crisis occurs when rulers exercise power without popular and instrumental legitimacy or when society explicitly expresses dissatisfaction with government action. It can be said a governance crisis is the product of congestion of demands on the part of the members of society, in such a way that the leaders of the State are unable to respond to most of them. The degree of public insecurity, the fractures to the rule of law, the levels of impunity, and the increasingly tense relationship between local and federal executives seem to put the Mexican State on the verge of a true governance crisis.

Image: “Feminists created a memorial for victims on the fence placed at National Palace” at https://elpais.com/elpais/2021/03/08/album/1615161781_186189.html



PUBLIC INSECURITY

As has been repeated on numerous occasions, insecurity has been considered one of the main concerns of Mexican society during the last 13 years. The number of high-impact crimes committed in the country during 2019, higher than in 2018, remained in 2020.

Although the INEGI Urban Public Safety Survey 2020 reported a brief decrease in the perception of insecurity that the population has in urban areas of the country, which went from 73% in March 2020 to 69% in September of the same year,⁷ this could be due to the massive lockdown due to the health crisis. At the same time, high-impact crimes do not show reductions. When analyzing the crimes of homicide and femicide in 2019 and 2020, it is observed that the first of these went from having 35,616 recorded during 2019 to 35,484 registered in 2020, that is, a reduction of merely 0.34%. Femicides, meanwhile, went from 968 in 2019 to 969 in 2020. The homicide rates for 2019 and 2020 are equivalent to 28.3 and 27.9 homicides

⁷ National Survey of Urban Public Safety. Press release no. 465/20. October 19, 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/ythvlfww>; “National Survey of Urban Public Security. Press release no. 18/21. January 19, 2021”, <https://tinyurl.com/ythvlfww>

The homicides went from having 35,616 recorded during 2019 to 35,484 registered in 2020, that is, a reduction of merely 0.34%.

In 2019 were committed 28.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and 27.9 in 2020.



Image: “From September to December 2020, Mexicans perceived that insecurity raised 0.3%”. Photo: Margarito Pérez, Cuartoscuro at <https://www.sinembargo.mx/19-01-2021/3926577>

per 100,000 inhabitants respectively. They are the highest rates since the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP) reported the figures, even above those reported in 2018 (27.8) and 2017 (24.0).

The femicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 0.8 in both 2019 and 2020. The cities with the most investigations for femicide in 2019 were Monterrey (19), Culiacán (17), Iztapalapa (15), Guadalajara (15) and San Luis Potosí (13). A year later they were Ciudad Juárez (19), Tijuana (18), Monterrey (17), Culiacán (13), Zapopan (13), Guadalajara (12) and Iztapalapa (12). It should be noted that this crime can be underrepresented by up to 80% (Common Cause, 2021).

800 women murdered per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 and 2020.

TABLE 11: NUMBER, RATE, AND THE AVERAGE HOMICIDES IN MEXICO PER YEAR

| YEAR | NUMBER OF MURDERS RECORDED | MURDER RATE REGISTERED PER 100,000 INHABITANTS | THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MURDERS RECORDED PER DAY |
|------|----------------------------|--|--|
| 2015 | 18,312 | 15.1 | 50 |
| 2016 | 23,188 | 19.0 | 63 |
| 2017 | 29,636 | 24.0 | 81 |
| 2018 | 34,655 | 27.8 | 95 |
| 2019 | 35,616 | 28.3 | 98 |
| 2020 | 35,484 | 27.9 | 97 |

Source: Common Cause with information from the SESNSP. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/1jdd9c4x>

TABLE 12: NUMBERS OF FEMINICIDES REGISTERED BY MUNICIPALITY (2019-2020)

| POSITION | MUNICIPALITY | NUMBER OF REGISTERED FEMICIDES | POSITION | MUNICIPALITY | NUMBER OF REGISTERED FEMICIDES |
|----------|---|--------------------------------|----------|--|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Monterrey (N.L.) | 19 | 1 | Juárez (Chih.) | 19 |
| 2 | Culiacán (Sin.) | 17 | 2 | Tijuana (B.C.) | 18 |
| 3 | Iztapalapa (Cd. Mx.) y Guadalajara (Jal.) | 15 | 3 | Monterrey (N.L.) | 17 |
| 4 | San Luis Potosí (S.LP.) | 13 | 4 | Culiacán (Sin.) and Zapopan (Jal) | 13 |
| 5 | Tijuana (B.C.) Y Juárez (Chih.) | 12 | 5 | Guadalajara (Jal.) and Iztapalapa (Cd. Mx.) | 12 |
| 6 | Puebla (Pue.), Centro (Tab.) y Toluca (Edo. Méx.) | 11 | 6 | Cuahtémoc (Cd. Mx.) and Tlalpan (Cd. Mx.) | 11 |
| 7 | Cuernavaca (Mor.) y Gustavo A. Madero (Cd. Mx) | 10 | 7 | Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (Jal.), García (N.L.), Morelia (Mich.) and San Luis Potosí (S.L.P.) | 9 |
| 8 | Chihuahua (Chih.), Chimalhuacán (Edo. Mex.) y Nogales (Son.), Tlajomulco (Jal.), Zapopan (Jal) y Benito Juárez (Q.R.) | 9 | 8 | Chihuahua (Chih.), Manzanillo (Col.), Ecatepec (Edo. Méx.), Puebla (Pue.), Tecamac (Edo. Méx.), Tultitlán (Edo. Méx.), Benito Juárez (Q. R.) and Veracruz (Ver.) | 8 |
| 9 | Guadalupe (N.L.), Morelia (Mich.) y Veracruz (Ver.) | 8 | 9 | Chimalhuacán (Edo.Méx.) | 7 |
| 10 | Acapulco (Gro.), Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Hermosillo (Son.) e Ixtapaluca (Edo. Mex.) | 7 | 10 | Ensenada (B.C.), Hermosillo (Son.), Nogales (Son.), Tonalá (Jal.), Gustavo A. Madero (Cd. Mx.), Torreón (Coah.), Venustiano Carranza (Cd. Mx.), and Zumpango (Edo. Méx.) | 6 |

Source: Common Cause with information from the SESNSP. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/1jdd9c4x>

It is striking that, although July 2018 is still the month with the most recorded homicides (3,158), March 2020 had the second-highest frequency of this crime (3,117). During 2019, Colima (98.5), Baja California (78.4), Chihuahua (67.1), Guanajuato (59.4) and Morelos (52.7) were the five states with the highest homicide rates, while in 2020 they were Colima (81.5), Baja California (78.8), Guanajuato (74.7), Chihuahua (70) and Zacatecas (65.8).

As for kidnapping, a 37% decrease was also reported between 2019 and 2020. The rate dropped from 1.3 per 100,000 inhabitants to 0.8 on the same scale. It should be noted that according to the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE), similarly to the aforementioned crimes, “a dark figure of crime”⁸ of 93.9% should be considered the incidence of kidnapping in the country. For its part, robbery had an underreporting of 91.2%.

Many analysts and civil society organizations have recognized the importance of strengthening local and state police forces to improve public safety in the country. In contrast, the government has systematically weakened these corporations.


⁸ The dark (or hidden) figure of crime is a term employed by criminologists and sociologists to describe the amount of unreported or undiscovered crime.

Many analysts and civil society organizations have recognized the importance of strengthening local and state police forces to improve public safety in the country.

In contrast, the current government dissolved the Strengthening Security Program (FORTASEG). It is the broadest pool of resources for strengthening sub-national police forces.

GRAPH 1: NUMBER OF MURDERS REGISTERED IN MEXICO (JANUARY 2015-DECEMBER 2020)


THOUSANDS
OF MURDERS



Source: Common Cause with information from the SESNSP. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/1jdd9c4x>

While the SEDENA and SEMAR budgets have reached their all-time highs, the current government dissolved the Strengthening Security Program (FORTASEG). It is the broadest pool of resources for strengthening sub-national police forces, equivalent to \$4 billion pesos.


Adding to the stagnation in crime incidence and the state’s inability to confront organized crime are alarming indicators of Mexico’s administration of justice. Justice administration is another of the historically unattended matters of the Mexican political system, which has not shown improvements. During the last ten years, the impunity registered in the country has exceeded 90%. In 2019 alone, the figure equaled 98.8%. Besides, in that year, only 11% of the crimes were reported and, among these, 65.8% are in temporary files, 14.8% were not prosecuted, only 3.4% had a link to court, and only 0.11% had an oral trial. Also, it cannot be ignored that between 2010 and 2019, the dark figure of crimes in the country was, on average, 92.8%. In 2019, the dark figure was 92.4, 0.8% less than in 2018.



Source: ENVIPE, INEGI 2020. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/z8pknksy>

GRAPH 3: REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING CRIMES

- CAUSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO AUTHORITY
- NOT SPECIFIED
- OTHER CAUSES




Source: ENVIPE, INEGI 2020. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/28pknksy>

TABLE 13: DARK FIGURE

| OFFENSE TYPE | PERCENTAGE 2018 | PERCENTAGE 2019 |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|
| Extortion | 97.9 | 97.1 |
| Other Crimes | 96.9 | 96.1 |
| Fraud | 95.5 | 95.9 |
| Partial vehicle theft | 94.8 | 94.7 |
| Theft or robbery on the street or public transport | 94.7 | 94.2 |
| Kidnapping | 91.2 | 93.9 |
| Other thefts | 93.3 | 91.5 |
| Burglary | 89.1 | 90.8 |
| Verbal threats | 89.0 | 86.0 |
| Injuries | 86.9 | 82.4 |
| Total vehicle theft | 38.1 | 39.0 |

Source: ENVIPE, INEGI 2020. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/28pknksy>

In line with previous years, the population reported that they do not report due to the inefficiency of the criminal justice system in most cases. The main reason why the victims did not report in 2019 was they consider it a waste of their time, followed by distrust of the authority, the length of the procedures, the hostile attitude of the administration, and the fear of being extorted (See graph 4).



Source: ENVIPE, INEGI 2020. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/28pknksy>



Image: “March against macho violence on February 2016 in Puebla (Mexico). Photo: Hugo Ortuno at https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/11/20/mexico/1479603778_996816.html

THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

Another source of potential governance crisis that the country may go through is that of the confrontation that has occurred in these first two years of government between the federal Executive and the local Executives. It is true that, during the 21st century, the Mexican political apparatus has been characterized by various disagreements between the heads of the different levels of government, although not in the current dimension. This was, on the one hand, the result of the democratization process that gave rise to a plural party system that brought characters from all the national political parties to the different powers and, on the other, due to the ambiguity of competence both at the constitutional and legal levels. During the presidency of López Obrador, who correlates powers not seen since 1997 that allows him to make decisions without too many counterweights, two groups of governors were consolidated: the Association of Governors of National Action, created on August 30, 2019 (López, 2019) and the Federalist Alliance, formed on June 10, 2019, by ten governors in response to what they considered as fiscal inequity, a lack of cooperation on the part of the federation in

matters of public security and in everything related to combating the pandemic (Infobae, 2020).

The main demands of these groups were: the negotiation of a new, more equitable fiscal pact (so that the entities have enough money to cover their responsibilities), a program of immediate support to the economy and household income due to the pandemic, the establishment of clear criteria for the use of the National Guard and the armed forces as subsidiaries to local police corporations, and that the distribution of vaccines was done through the 32 state governments (Government of Jalisco, 2020). The President, as a counterpart, disqualified these governors by labeling what they were doing as politicking (IMPACTO, 2020). The tension rose to such an extent that the members of the Federalist Alliance resigned to remain in the National Governors' Conference (CONAGO) (Animal Político, 2020) and threatened to break the federal pact (El Universal, 2020). Faced with the governors' demands, the President has chosen to ignore them and has reaffirmed that the federal government owes nothing to the states, that there is no more money and that the federal pact cannot be broken.

Regarding the Mexican State having fewer resources than before, when analyzing data, it is indeed observed that the resources for the entities have decreased by 2021. Through Branch 23, the subnational budget had an actual reduction of 5.5% between 2020 and 2021. Branch 28 declined 5.7% in real terms in the same period, and Branch 33 decreased 0.3%.

By way of shares, all entities had cuts. Nayarit (10%), Quintana Roo (9%), Mexico City (9%), and Sinaloa (9%) were the states with the greatest reductions between 2020 and 2021. Regarding contributions, 11 entities experienced an increase compared to the pre-

vious year (Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, Puebla, Colima, Quintana Roo, Durango, Campeche, Yucatán, Baja California and San Luis Potosí). In 2021 the states with the greatest dependence on federalized spending are Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Guerrero since they received 96.3%, 95.7%, 94.7, and 94.5% of all their income, respectively, through this route. On the contrary, the states with the least dependence on these transfers are Quintana Roo, Mexico City, and Nuevo León, whose own revenues makeup 28%, 25.6%, and 25.2% of their total revenues respectively.

TABLE 14: REAL BUDGET VARIATION OF THE STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES: 2019-2021

| BRANCH | 2019 | 2020 | % VAR 20-19 | 2021 | % VAR 21-20 |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Branch 23: Wage and economic provisions | 112,996,657,654 | 127,352,829,506 | 12.7% | 120,296,357,089 | -5.5% |
| Branch 28: Participations to States and Municipalities | 919,817,447,799 | 921,609,834,565 | 0.2% | 869,434,557,199 | -5.7% |
| Branch 33: Federal Contributions for States and Municipalities | 735,758,572,815 | 735,928,329,159 | 0.0% | 733,971,719,047 | -0.3% |
| TOTAL | 1,768,572,678,268 | 1,784,890,993,230 | 4.3% | 1,723,702,633,335 | -3.8% |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the Expenditure Budget of the Federation 2021. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/4za3vszp>

TABLE 15: PERCENTAGE VARIATION OF THE SHARES AND CONTRIBUTIONS ASSIGNED TO THE FEDERATIVE ENTITIES 2020-2021

| ENTITY | CHANGE IN SHARES | CHANGE IN CONTRIBUTIONS | ENTITY | CHANGE IN SHARES | CHANGE IN CONTRIBUTIONS |
|---------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Aguascalientes | -7 | 3 | Sinaloa | -9 | 0 |
| Baja California | -6 | 1 | Michoacán | -5 | -2 |
| Baja California Sur | -8 | -5 | Morelos | -8 | -1 |
| Campeche | -7 | 2 | Nayarit | -10 | 0 |
| Chiapas | -5 | -1 | Nuevo León | -7 | -4 |
| Chihuahua | -6 | -4 | Oaxaca | -7 | -1 |
| Ciudad de México | -9 | -2 | Puebla | -7 | 3 |
| Coahuila | -7 | -3 | Querétaro | -8 | -2 |
| Colima | -8 | 2 | Quintana Roo | -9 | 2 |
| Durango | -7 | 2 | Sonora | -8 | -3 |
| Estado de México | -5 | -3 | Tabasco | -5 | -8 |
| Guanajuato | -7 | -4 | Tamaulipas | -6 | 7 |
| Guerrero | -5 | -1 | Tlaxcala | -3 | -2 |
| Hidalgo | -6 | -2 | Veracruz | -6 | 0 |
| Jalisco | -6 | -2 | Yucatán | -6 | 1 |
| San Luis Potosí | -6 | 1 | Zacatecas | -8 | 7 |



ENTITIES WITH THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS BETWEEN 2020 AND 2021: NAYARIT, QUINTANA ROO, CIUDAD DE MÉXICO Y SINALOA

Source: In-house elaboration with information from the report Resources assigned to Federative Entities 2021.



The health tragedy of the pandemic

A photograph of a cemetery in Mexico where workers are digging graves. In the foreground, a worker wearing a red cap, a light-colored jacket with reflective stripes, and a white face mask is using a shovel to dig a grave. Another worker is visible in the background, also digging. The ground is sandy and uneven, with several large, rectangular concrete slabs lying on the surface. In the background, there are other graves, some with flowers, and a few people standing around. The overall scene is one of a busy, somber cemetery during a pandemic.

AP Photo/Marco Ugarte at <https://www.tampabay.com/centro/2020/o6/o8/cementerios-mexicanos-ultimo-eslabon-de-la-pandemia/>

THE HEALTH TRAGEDY OF THE PANDEMIC

Before the SARS-CoV-2 virus's arrival, all nations were exposed and made efforts to protect their populations from the speed of a virus that has left millions of deaths worldwide. Measures taken attempting to stop the spread of the virus have been very lax in Mexico, where the handling of the pandemic has reflected poor management, even when the President affirmed on February 28, 2020, that Mexico was prepared to face the pandemic.



Video 9, Morning press conference, February 28, 2020 <https://tinyurl.com/sphbusjz>

Neither has there been a significant budget increase⁹ nor in increase in the immunization effort¹⁰ that will

⁹ According to the PEF 2021, the additional spending on health is equivalent to only 1.85% more than the budget for 2020.

¹⁰ Mexico has been one of the countries both globally and in Latin America with the least administered doses of the Covid-19 vaccine per 100 people, compared to countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and even under-developed economies such as Chile and Brazil. Available on: <https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations>



Image: “Family members weep close to a man’s coffin, while his funeral in a cemetery in Mexico City, on August 6, 2020.” at <https://www.france24.com/es/20200807-covid19-muertos-pandemia-rebrotes> © Henry Romero / Reuters.

determine the preservation of millions of Mexican lives and curb the decline of the national economy.

We are living in a critical moment, where deficiencies and limitations are the common denominators. Very high levels of mortality have been reported. Mexico is the 2nd country with the highest fatality rate and the 3rd in the total number of deaths. Furthermore, many families had to sacrifice income to get oxygen concentrators or drugs, which do not guarantee life to those who use them. In fact, the “COVID Resilience Ranking” prepared by Bloomberg and updated in February 2021 places Mexico in the worst place to live during the pandemic.¹¹ The President disqualified the publication presenting, without technical information or data to support it, the argument that this does not affect anything because “most people don’t even find out”.



Video 10, Morning press conference, November 26, 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/53wf3bz8>

Pain, suffering, and death are how the course of the pandemic in Mexico can be summed up. The current health challenge is being able to immunize the entire population, using vaccines already on the world market. The health crisis has left a devastating impact on the main development sectors of the country. In its wake, it has spread to practically all social classes, determining and limiting the lives of millions of Mexicans in the country.

The President disqualified the publication presenting, without technical information or data to support it, the argument that this does not affect anything because “most people don’t even find out”.

¹¹ The report places Mexico in 53rd place out of 53 nations from various regions of the world.


THE COST OF A PANDEMIC

The pandemic's challenge for Mexico and the world was determined by the speed of infection in countries. The association of the management of the pandemic and the success in reducing infections and deaths is exposed in the data that reflects its good or bad management before the millions of people affected worldwide.


By the end of March 2020, countries such as Italy or Spain were in full crisis and reported a growing number of cases: 41,035 infections and 3,405 deaths, and 17,963 infections and 830 deaths respectively. (Figure 1 and 2).

Meanwhile, in Mexico in March 2020, the process of acknowledgment and acceptance of the severity of the virus was just beginning. At that time, the number of infections worldwide was 209,842 with 8,778 deaths;¹² while in Mexico there were already 164 infections and the first death was being reported (Vital Signals, 2020c).

¹² Google News. Coronavirus. Available at : <https://tinyurl.com/y8x3nncp>



Source: Coronavirus Resource Center. Johns Hopkins University of Medicine (2020).



Source: Coronavirus Resource Center. Johns Hopkins University of Medicine (2020).

Currently, the figures are very conclusive, revealing the death of up to five Mexicans per minute only due to Covid-19¹³ (General Directorate of Epidemiology, 2021).

On the other hand, according to the Bloomberg Covid-19 Resilience Ranking, updated on February 25, 2021, of the 53 selected economies, Mexico is the least successful country at containing the virus with the least possible social and economic disruption. It is the worst rated in 2 out the 6 indicators considered (Chart 16). It is considered “the worst” in the indicators: percentage of positive tests, and the case fatality rate in a month, the most discredited indicators (Graph 5).

This information reveals that, relative to other countries, health is not a priority in Mexico: there are no vaccines available where immunization is sought. Mexico has the highest death rates from Covid-19 as a proportion of positive cases until November 2020 and the highest percentage high of Covid-19 tests with positive results. Mexico has proven less qualified than countries like Nigeria, which ranks

¹³ With 7,201 positive deaths from Covid-19 and 7,811 suspected only for the third week of 2021.




Image: “Today started vaccination against Covid 19 for senior citizens in Mexico City”. Photo: © Oswaldo Ramírez / Forbes México February 15, 2021 at <https://www.forbes.com.mx/noticias-sin-cita-ni-registro-comienza-vacunacion-de-adultos-mayores-en-cdmx/>

TABLE 16: THE TEN ECONOMIES THAT HAVE HANDLED THE PANDEMIC THE WORST

| <div> <div>←</div> <div>BETTER</div> <div>WORSE</div> <div>→</div> </div> | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|--|---|--|------------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|
| NO. | ECONOMICS | BLOOMBERG COVID RESILIENCE SCORE | CASES IN ONE MONTH PER 100,000 INHABI- TANTS | LETHALNESS RATE PER CASES IN A MONTH | TOTAL, DEATHS PER MILLION | POSITIVE TEST RATE | ACCESS TO VAC- CINES AGAINST COVID | VACCINE AGAINST COVID, ADMINIS- TERED PER 100 PEOPLE |
| 43 | COLOMBIA | 43,60 | 429 | 3,60% | 1,162 | 11.3% | 73% | 0,09 |
| 44 | PORTUGAL | 43,10 | 1,598 | 3,40% | 1,578 | 7.1% | 231% | 6,76 |
| 45 | IRAN | 42,90 | 259 | 1,00% | 710 | 14.1% | 5% | 0,01 |
| 46 | SOUTH AFRICA | 42,40 | 156 | 9,20% | 833 | 6.1% | 39% | 0,05 |
| 47 | EGYPT | 42,40 | 17 | 8,40% | 102 | | 61% | 0,00 |
| 48 | INDONESIA | 42,30 | 113 | 2,30% | 128 | 27.3% | 55% | 0,77 |
| 49 | NIGERIA | 41,70 | 15 | 1,20% | 9 | 12.5% | 5% | 0,00 |
| 50 | BRAZIL | 41,70 | 665 | 2,20% | 1,169 | | 76% | 3,49 |
| 51 | CZECH REPUBLIC | 40,60 | 2,156 | 1,80% | 1,824 | 14.30 | 231% | 5,27 |
| 52 | PERU | 39,70 | 585 | 2,90% | 1,373 | 24.8% | 38% | 0,60 |
| 53 | MEXICO | 33,00 | 224 | 11,10% | 1,410 | 28.6% | 119% | 1,36 |

Source: Chang, Hong & Varley (2020)

GRAPH 5: ECONOMIES WITH THE WORST MANAGEMENT OF THE PANDEMIC



Source: In-house elaboration with information from Chang, Hong & Varley (2020)

158th in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI)¹⁴ while Mexico ranks 76th out of 186.¹⁵

¹⁴ OXFAM. Nigeria. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/y7f8umhn>.

¹⁵ UNDP (2019). Human Development Report 2019. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/59dttwvs>.

Currently, the data indicates that countries such as the United States, India, and Brazil are the countries with the highest number of total cases of Covid-19 (28.9, 11.1, and 10.2 million accumulated infections, respectively). The United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States are the first three countries worldwide with the most deaths from the virus (1,781, 1,595, and 1,547 deaths per million inhabitants).¹⁶


Unfortunately, internationally, Mexico is one of the first countries with the most total cases of Covid-19, ranking 13th out of 221 registered countries. It is also the 5th country with the highest number of deaths per million inhabitants, without neglecting that in Latin America it occupies first place with 1,391 deaths per million inhabitants (Graph 6). As recently as this past January 22, official data found that a Mexican was dying of Covid-19 every 48 seconds.

Mexico is one of the first countries with the most total cases of Covid-19, ranking 13th out of 221 registered countries.

It is also the 5th country with the highest number of deaths per million inhabitants, and the first place in Latin America.

¹⁶ Cut to February 23, 2021 with data from Worldometer. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/4jcrypyv>

GRAPH 6: COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST INFECTIONS AND DEATHS FROM COVID-19



Source: In-house elaboration with data from Worldometer (2021).

Even with all these studies, data, and information from different national and foreign sources, the President affirmed on November 20, 2020, that the strategy taken by his government in the face of the pandemic was a success, a world example, and that there was no reason to change it.



Video 11, Morning press conference,
November 20 2020,
<https://tinyurl.com/dhbj3baf>

The Covid-19 effects have not been limited to direct deaths in those infected by the virus, but have indirectly affected the general population. In other words, the limited prioritization of patients with the virus has caused many other consequences, such as the collapse of hospitals, the overcrowding of beds, the shortage of medicines, and the discontinued treatment of diseases and chronic conditions that demand medicines and constant attention. These indicators are reflected in the number of deaths due to the virus and neglect in other health priorities.

Without a doubt, the most lethal blow of the pandemic is reflected in the “excess of deaths,” calculated by the Ministry of Health until week 50 (specifically on December 12, 2020). According to this information, 680,031 deaths were calculated based on the average number of deaths registered in the previous five years (Ministry of Health, 2021).¹⁷ However, the observed deaths in 2020 were 954,517, implying 40.4% more deaths than already occurred in Mexico each year (equating to 274,486 extra deaths).

Without a doubt, the most lethal blow of the pandemic is reflected in the “excess of deaths,” calculated by the Ministry of Health until week 50.

According to this information, 680,031 deaths were calculated.

¹⁷ Expected deaths from 2015 to 2018.

The abandonment of care is gathered from the number of discharged patients, which decreased in 2020 for conditions other than Covid-19. In other words, discharges in hospitals that attend most health problems have fallen by 997,872 releases compared to 2019.¹⁸ The abandonment of millions of Mexicans features within the indirect effects of Covid-19, such as deaths related to poverty. Its importance refers to its relationship to a health system on the verge of collapse and the vulnerability of more than half of Mexicans who live in a context of poverty and extreme poverty.

Due to advances in science and the robustness of the health system, maternal and infant mortality and deaths from diseases of past centuries should no longer exist. However, under a health system crisis like the one Mexicans are currently experiencing, their prevalence has increased again. Regarding maternal mortality, this continues to be one of the main causes of deaths among those living extreme poverty. As part of the Millennium Development Goals, Mexico was to reduce maternal mortality by 75%, i.e. de-

¹⁸ The second level of care, which provides basic specialties in general or specialty hospitals and has diagnostic imaging and laboratory support services.



Image: “A mother with her baby in her arms in Mexico City during pandemic”. Photo: María Ruiz/at <http://www.ipsnoticias.net/2020/07/covid-acelera-la-crisis-la-muerte-materna-mexico/>

crease deaths per 100,000 live births from 89 (Maternal Death Ratio registered in 1990) to 22 deaths by 2015. However, as indicated in the report “Countdown to 2015”, which evaluated the fulfillment of the Millennium Goals, it did not manage to do so and was one of the 69 countries that did not reach the goal of reducing maternal mortality.¹⁹

The actual maternal mortality ratio was 34.7 per 100 thousand live births when the target goal was no more than 22.3. Mexico was 12.4 points above, a tragedy considering it is an entirely avoidable situation with medical knowledge and the health system’s treatments (Acción Ciudadana, 2020). Unfortunately, in the first week of December 2020, 853 accumulated deaths were registered according to the reports for the epidemiological surveillance of maternal deaths 2020,²⁰ while for the same cut of 2019, 647 were registered. The described represents an increase of 206 maternal deaths (31.8%) in 2020 compared to 2019.

¹⁹ WHO (2015). Countdown to 2015. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/r6t3s4ca>

²⁰ General Directorate of Epidemiology. (2020) Secretariat of Health Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/yf5hunab>

The maternal mortality ratio was 34.7 per 100 thousand live births when the target goal was no more than 22.3. In other words, we were 12.4 points higher, which is an avoidable tragedy.



Image: Photo: Mike Acosta in *El Sol de Hermosillo* at <https://tinyurl.com/f2pa6y87>


Infant mortality casts a dramatic picture since 10% of deaths of children under five years of age (almost 3,000 in 2018) are due to curable diseases. The treatments are accessible, their cost is minimal, and their application does not require specialized knowledge (Acción Ciudadana, 2020, p.13).

According to data from the 2030 Agenda worldwide, 17,000 fewer children die every day than in 1990, but more than five million children die each year before their fifth birthday. Since 2000, measles vaccines have prevented nearly 15.6 million deaths.

At a national level, according to CONEVAL, 50% of the population under 18 years of age was in poverty in 2018, and only 18 out of every 100 children in Mexico were considered non-poor or non-vulnerable. What these data reveal is the overwhelming reality of the vulnerability of life during childhood.

Similarly, according to the Citizen Action Against Poverty report, “Death has permission,” as malaria, dengue, dysentery, cholera, and other diseases transmitted by insects and other vectors have been curable for centuries. In Mexico, there are still 11,000 deaths from these causes, which are unacceptable.

According to the Ministry of Health, vector-borne diseases such as dengue in any of its derivatives, marsh fever (malaria), spotted fever, Zika virus disease, among others, are diseases that put the population at risk. This despite being treatable with moderate-cost drugs and timely care in first-level units and they have been increasing, which is why they are considered diseases characteristic of extreme poverty.



Source: In-house elaboration with information from the General Directorate of Health Information (DGIS).

In 2017, 570 diseases of this type were reported, 1,337 in 2018, 1,414 in 2019, taking a giant leap in 2020 reporting 5,702 illnesses.

| <i>Diseases of extreme poverty</i> | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| <i>Annual disease report</i> | |
| <i>2018</i> | <i>1,337</i> |
| <i>2019</i> | <i>1,414</i> |
| <i>2020</i> | <i>5,702</i> |



Image: “Dengue fever hits Mexico: the number of cases multiplied in 2020 up to 1,455” Photo: Reuters/Archivo at <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/03/04/el-dengue-golpea-a-mexico-el-numero-de-casos-se-multiplico-en-2020-y-ya-son-1455/>

THE COLLAPSE OF THE HEALTH SYSTEM

Adequate access to health implies, among other elements, having the guarantee of access to medicines and medical supplies. Among other problems, the shortage of medicines and the lack of vaccines have exposed the weaknesses in the health sector in Mexico in the face of the arrival of a virus that is taking the lives of millions of Mexicans nationwide.

After two years of government, one of the objectives President Andrés Manuel referred to was Mexico having a “health system like the one that Canada, the United Kingdom or Denmark have”.



Video 12, Morning press conference, January 30, 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/5ezm2kr4>

The other objective referred to the adequate access for all Mexicans to quality services. Both are decisions that imply essential changes. However, the data reflect the failed strategy that the federal Executive has followed.

As in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal (among others), medical service models based on the Beveridge Model, such as the British National Health Service, became an icon of the welfare state. In this system, legal residents have free access without any co-payment to primary care, outpatient consultations for specialized care, hospital admissions, and emergency services. However, these health models are financed mainly by national taxes and assigned budgets, based on clinical needs and not on the user's ability to pay.




Image: Example of Mexican hospitals. Boletín at <https://tinyurl.com/nzcecvuu>



Image: “Intensive care units for Covid-19. APG” in Canada. EFE. Los Tiempos at <https://tinyurl.com/yryhjycc>


Even though both objectives pursue basic coverage in the health system, the consultations provided per year since the beginning of the current administration in Mexico have decreased, even without considering the Covid-19 pandemic. Consultations in first-level establishments have drastically reduced from 2018, with 926 million fewer consultations in 2019, even before the arrival of Covid-19. Although to a lesser extent, the hospitalization units also presented a decrease of 156 million fewer consultations from 2019 to 2020 (Graph 8).

The abandonment of care is gathered from the number of discharged patients year after year. Since 2018, these have decreased, including in 2020 for conditions other than Covid-19. In other words, discharges from hospitals that attend most health problems have fallen by 997,872 releases compared to 2019²¹ (Graph 9).



Source: In-house elaboration with information from the General Directorate of Health Information (DGIS).

²¹ The second level of care, which provides basic specialties in general or specialty hospitals and has diagnostic imaging and laboratory support services.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Ministry of Health (2020)

In the context of the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, data from the Federal Ministry of Health indicate high hospital occupancy levels. Only in Mexico City, the occupancy in general hospital beds is 83%; in the State of Mexico, it is 71%; Guanajuato, 66%; Durango, 60%; and Hidalgo, 59%. They are the entities in the top five of general hospital saturation.

Mexico City also leads in occupancy of beds with a ventilator, with 71%; while Aguascalientes has 65%;

Baja California, 63%; the State of Mexico, 53%; and Zacatecas, 48%.

From another perspective, according to Colectivo Cero Desabasto (2019), headed by Nosotrxs AC,²² (who represent a network of more than 23 thousand patients in Mexico for the collective demand for the right to

²² The group makes its digital platform available as a communication bridge between citizens and public officials responsible for supply to account for the failures in the Chain of Access to Medicines and Supplies.

health and access to medicines),²³ the percentage of non-stocked prescriptions increased from the last four months of 2019 until before the contingency.

This, apparently due to the change in the drug procurement process. The President announced a drug distribution scheme based on the Coca-Cola model would be created to guarantee its correct distribution in July 2019



Video 13, Visit to San Cayetano, Nayarit, July 12 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/3zbtue7f>

He mentioned it again a year later, in July 2020




Video 14, Morning press conference July 29 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/dcc365z8>

without this plan having been formally presented to date.

²³ The foregoing in order to facilitate communication between the parties and to be able to assertively collaborate in cases of non-supply and solve them efficiently.

Throughout 2020, although this shortage index has been reduced, the figures are still six times above the normal levels of the beginning of 2019. It has not been possible to recover the supply of medicines.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from Nosotrxs (2021).

Adequate access to medicines and other health technologies implies having the necessary treatments and supplies to cure and treat disease at the right time, with the appropriate quality, and for as long as the patient requires (Servan Mori *et al.*, 2013).

The previously mentioned shortage of medicines is only one of the current health system's problems. More resources are also required to mitigate system failures. The Expenditure Budget of the Federation 2021 considers only 1.85% more than what is allocated to the 2020 budget.²⁴ The government's priority is not to address the health catastrophe, but rather to adhere to Republican austerity, where part of its impact is on the pockets of millions of Mexicans.


VACCINATION PROCESS

The bad news do not end, and the hope of returning to a “normal life” is increasingly overshadowed. Despite the rhetoric of the Federal Executive in Mexico, vaccination is not being the priority to safeguard life.

In comparison with both developed and developing countries that seek to preserve the lives of their inhabitants, Mexico is one of the countries that, at the writing of this report, has applied fewer vaccines compared to the United Kingdom or the United States, even compared to other Latin American countries

²⁴ Health spending for 2020 was \$679,672 million pesos while for 2021 this item amounts to \$692,430 million. SHCP (2020) Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/bi7et1vo>

such as Chile and Brazil (Graph 11). While contracts establish the number and suppliers of acquired doses, the date, the number of vaccines to be administered, and the logistics of the storage and application remain undefined (Chart 17).



Source: In-house elaboration with information from Our World in Data (2021)

| TABLE 17: STATUS OF VACCINES IN MEXICO | | |
|---|--|--------------------|
| VACCINE | STATUS | DATE |
| BioNTech/ Pfizer/ Fosun Pharma/ Rentschler Biopharma | COFEPRIS of Mexico granted “emergency use authorization.” One million seven hundred sixty-nine thousand six hundred twenty-five vaccines have been received; 562,311 doctors have received the second dose; that is, they have their complete vaccination scheme. | 11/12/2020 |
| Universidad de Oxford, Oxford Biomedica-AstraZeneca / IQVIA | Mexico granted “emergency use authorization”: Cofepris approved the vaccine, and in an agreement with Mexico and Argentina, the active ingredient of this inoculation is being worked on. This is the second vaccine applied in the country, and 870 thousand doses have been delivered. | 06/01/2021 |
| Spuntnik V | Authorized by COFEPRIS: The Russian vaccine was authorized by the Committee of New Molecules of Cofepris for its emergency use; This vaccine has been applied in Mexico City, in the Iztacalco, Tláhuac, and Xochimilco municipalities. | 2/February/2021 |
| Cansino | It was authorized by the New Molecules Committee of Cofepris for emergency use, and two million doses of the vaccine were delivered to be packaged in Querétaro; so far, none have been applied. | 10/ February/ 2021 |
| SinoVac | The vaccine arrived in the country in previous weeks. The contract is for 10 million doses in a period of four months. The first delivery was 200 thousand vaccines. https://tinyurl.com/ybpdq4v6 | 9/ February/ 2021 |

Source: In-house elaboration with information from Craven and Milenio (2021).

The follow-up to the population’s immunization follows worldwide vaccine application, where important differences within the health frameworks of each country must be considered.

In Mexico, the vaccination plan includes five stages (Chart 18), where on October 13, 2020, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, Marcelo Ebrad, assured that Mexico was in the same condition as the United States, the European Union, and other countries in

the world by having secured vaccines for Mexicans. He then affirmed that between December 2020 and 2021, Mexico would have access from 15.5 million to 34.4 million doses.²⁵

However, the amounts applied so far leave much to be desired concerning the vaccination plan. There is also no clarity on the information regarding the purchase of vaccines, logistics, and distribution.

| CHART 18: VACCINATION PLAN IN MEXICO | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| | POPULATION | DATE |
| 1 | Covid-19 front-line health personnel | December 2020 – February 2021 |
| 2 | Remaining health personnel and people over 60 years of age | February – April |
| 3 | People from 50 to 69 years old | April – May 2021 |
| 4 | 40 and 49-year-olds | May – Jun 2021 |
| 5 | Rest of the population | Jun 2021 – March 2020 |

Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Ministry of Health.


However, Pharmacovigilance warns that the lack of
²⁵ Message from the Secretary of Foreign Relations. Communiqué dated October 1, 2020. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/22bp5ma4>

applications, which delay the vaccination stages, indicating that 36,400 people must be vaccinated daily to meet the goal²⁶ (Mexican Association of Pharmacovigilance). The first stage of vaccination was intended for around 1.2 million health workers on the frontline against Covid-19, which should take two months as, according to the federal government plan, all must have been immunized by the end of February.

Relative to the total number of vaccines obtained, people vaccinated (at least with a single dose), and people fully vaccinated, countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom have led the efforts toward of immunization, unlike countries in Latin America. Unfortunately, Mexico is one of the countries with the least availability of vaccines, the least number of partially vaccinated people, and the least number of fully vaccinated people.

Unfortunately, political interests seem to be guiding the health decisions of the 4T government in the ab-

²⁶ Mexican association of pharmacovigilance (AMFV) (2021). Media meeting. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/563bpuwh>



Source: In-house elaboration with data from Méndez Vargas (2020).

Unfortunately, political interests seem to be guiding the health decisions of the 4T government in the absence of a clear vaccination plan and the incorporation of the “Servants of the Nation” (SN) to the vaccination.

sence of a clear vaccination plan and the incorporation of the “Servants of the Nation” (SN) to the vaccination brigades. Factually, the National Vaccination Policy Document (updated on January 11) does not include incorporating the SN in vaccination. The only mention is about the formation of 12-member brigades, which include 30,000 servants of the nation at-

tached to the Ministry of Welfare²⁷, and the personnel of the various institutions of the health sector Sedena, Navy, and volunteer personnel.

According to official figures at the writing of this re-

²⁷ Mexican Government. (2021). National Vaccination Policy against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, for the prevention of Covid-19 in Mexico. Guiding document. p. 23. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/2nckzkt6>

port, the vaccination process generates many uncertainties against SARS-CoV-2, the virus that has caused the death of more than 183,000 Mexicans. The person in charge of the entire federal government vaccination plan, Miriam Esther Veras Godoy, resigned recently “for personal reasons”. She had worked as an External Evaluator of the Vaccination program in Mexico and as National Coordinator of the International Evaluation of Components: Diarrheal diseases, respiratory infections, and nutrition, of the Child Health Care Program in Mexico.

The absence of a health plan in the face of pandemic management promotes opacity and facilitates discretion in decision-making. Additionally, Mexico’s fiscal response to the pandemic has been modest compared to its peers, reflecting the authorities’ desire not to issue new debt for health expenditures at the cost of the lives of millions of Mexicans. This approach, however, runs the risk of producing a more severe recession and a weaker economic recovery, as has been observed so far, with higher social and economic costs in the near future, as will be discussed later.



Image: “I resigned because of stress claims the head of vaccination strategy in Mexico” said Miriam Esther Veras Godoy at <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2021/01/renuncia-encargada-vacunacion-mexico-motivos-personales-salud/>



A photograph of a crowded street in Mexico City, likely during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many people are wearing face masks. In the foreground, a person wearing a wide-brimmed straw hat and a white face mask is out of focus. In the center, a man in a blue and white plaid shirt and a white face mask is walking towards the camera. To his right, a woman in a yellow shirt and a colorful patterned face mask is walking, holding a smartphone. In the background, a man in a red shirt and a black face mask is visible, along with a woman in a black shirt and a black face mask. A blue umbrella is open in the upper right corner. The text "The collapse of wellbeing and economy" is overlaid on the left side of the image.

The collapse of wellbeing and economy

<https://latinus.us/2020/10/08/desempleo-mexico-llegar-11-oit-pandemia-covid/>

PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL BALANCE

One of the main characteristics of the current government is the emphasis on keeping a harmonious financial balance, in which incomes and expenses are as closely matched as possible to avoid incurring more public debt. As part of that narrative, López Obrador's government has emphasized redirecting his spending towards "the poor" emanating from supposed savings due to the "elimination" of corruption. That is the narrative and indeed has managed to obtain a primary fiscal surplus in 2019 and 2021, which means that he has not had to ask for loans to pay interests. In 2019 the primary surplus was \$275 billion pesos (mmp), and in 2020 it was reduced to just \$31.7mmp.²⁸ In usual times this is an achievement; in economic crisis and pandemic times, it's a sin with towering costs to the wellbeing of families and companies.

Reaching a primary fiscal surplus implies having high incomes and low spending. Or the use of previous savings to finance spending that exceeds the ordi-

²⁸All tributary information on this section was obtained through different reports from the website "Números de Erario" from México Evalúa <https://tinyurl.com/2bjnbuf>

nary incomes generated by the government. From 2018-2020 public revenue fell 2.6%, essentially due to oil income contraction. It dropped \$253 mmp in 2019 compared to the previous year and \$349.9 mmp in 2020. Today, fiscal income from oil is approximately half on average compared to the previous administration (\$1208 mmp from 2012-2018).²⁹ For their part, the tributary income behavior from non-oils was relatively satisfactory on SAT's (Tax Administration Service) behalf. The tax burden grew slightly despite economic contraction (barely 0.8% and 0.9% in 2018 and 2019). SAT performed a special audit on the income tax of big taxpayers; from them, they got a collection three times bigger in 2020 compared to the previous year.³⁰ Nonetheless, it must be noted that diverse voices denounced having been intimidated by the federal government for their companies to withdraw tax disputes. In light of alleged intimidation acts, the American Bar Association, on October

²⁹The reduction in oil fiscal incomes is due to the reduction of oil production, the international price of the hydrocarbon, and the reduction of the tax rate on Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos.).

³⁰<https://tinyurl.com/29cr5534>

20th, 2020, sent a letter to President López Obrador urging him to respect the rule of law, particularly the right to fight back intimidatory acts from the fiscal authority (<https://tinyurl.com/cbhh2z9n>).³¹

To compensate the fall in incomes and achieve a primary surplus, the government used funds that were accumulated for years to be used for specific purposes, like the Budgetary Income Stability Fund (FEIP) that had \$290 mmp, which was practically emptied within the first two years of López Obrador's government.³² The Stabilization Fund for Federative Organizations (FEIEF) also substantially reduced by \$31.9 mmp just in 2020. Along the same lines, the federal government took \$55.3 mmp from different trusts, including the New Airport Construction Trust (\$2.6 mmp).

³¹ The letter ends with the following paragraph: "The ABA urges you to ensure that your administration respects the Rule of Law and to instruct all government officials to respect the right of the people to seek legal counsel, including being accompanied by their chosen advisor during all meetings with government officials and, when they deem appropriate, defend their rights through administrative or judicial proceedings, free from government interference with proper legal counsel".

³² This trust had at the beginning of this government 289 mmp and it only ended with 9.5 in 2020.



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October 20, 2020

His Excellency Andrés Manuel López Obrador
Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Plaza de la Constitución S/N,
Centro Histórico de la Cdad. de México, Centro, Cuauhtémoc,
06066 Ciudad de México, CDMX, México

RE: Respect for the Rule of Law and to the right to legal representation

Dear Mr. President,

One of the pillars of the American Bar Association (ABA) is respect and protection for the Rule of Law (*Estado de Derecho*), including the right to legal representation, and the right to practice the legal profession. Throughout its history, the ABA has stood for and defended these rights vigorously.

During your presidential campaign as well as during your administration, you have called for a transformation of public life in Mexico, with the goal to end corruption and tax evasion. These goals are to be commended and should be the standard in any society.

Recently, however, there have been public reports that in relation to compliance with tax obligations, (i) several high-ranking officials of the Servicio de Administración Tributaria have stated that members of the legal profession are an obstacle to the Mexican government's goals for transformation; (ii) government officials have called for persons or entities that are perceived not to have complied with their legal obligations to refrain from seeking legal representation and instead approach government agencies directly to correct the alleged misconducts; and (iii) the Procuraduría Fiscal de la Federación is initiating or threatening to initiate criminal investigations as a negotiating tactic to pressure persons or entities to correct whatever tax-related misconduct they perceive has been committed.

The ABA strongly opposes any action taken by governments to curtail the people's right to seek legal counsel, to a fair trial or proceeding, or to challenge the alleged violation of any law or statute through appropriate legal channels. The actions are in breach of fundamental notions of due process and the human rights granted, among others, by Articles 14, 17, and 20, section B, subsection VIII of the Political Constitution of Mexico and Articles 8, paragraph 2, subsection d) and 25 of the American Convention of Human Rights, to which Mexico is a party. These rights are intimately linked to the right of attorneys, consultants, and litigators to engage in the practice of law, to give legal advice and to represent their clients against government actions. Full respect for these rights is the hallmark of every democratic society and the standard of democratic governments.

Image: 1/2 pages of the letter to the President from the American Bar Association at <https://tinyurl.com/cbhh2z9n>

Government expenditure has been stagnant at around \$6,000 mmp in the last three years. In 2020 it was 1.6% less than approved for the year. Republican austerity was applied with the following priorities: the government kept its flagship projects (Dos Bocas refinery, Mayan Train, and Santa Lucía's airport), injected resources to Pemex and CFE (Federal Electricity Commission), raised expenditure in social programs and on health due to the pandemic. Likewise, public investments remained stagnant in absolute terms since 2017. In 2020 the total amount of public investment was \$617.9 mmp.³³

As it has been said in previous reports, the federal government barely established a support program of 0.7% of the GDP for people and companies to face the pandemic. In addition to the expenditure approved by Congress, the government discretionally redirected resources from most of the dependencies that experienced underspending until November 2020. This represented 7% of the approved total expenditure for that month. The federal government shifted

these resources towards the end of the year to the Secretariat of National Defense, Health, Energy, and Treasury, which had more than 50% exceeding expenditure pertaining to the approved budget. The most exceeded budgetary line was "Trust transference, mandates, and other analogs," spending three times more than the budget (328% or \$121 mmp). The federal government executed its new attribution to spend any underspending discretionally.

Thus, albeit apparently keeping a fiscal balance, the federal government faced the income reduction with less spending and using the prior year's savings found in funds and trusts. However, the highest indebtedness (\$847 mmp just in 2020) and the drop of the GDP in 2020 raised the public debt from 44.9 to 52.2% of the GDP.³⁴ This 7.3% increase in the first two years is almost the same increase on public debt as in Enrique Peña Nieto's administration.

³³ The Investment reduction occurred in spite that in 2020 SAT classified as public investment 35 mmp that spent in simple Word crediting to micro and medium sized enterprises, which does not constitute capital formation. When you add the "official" figure of public investments in 2020 was 653.3 mmp.

³⁴ Measured as The Historic Balance of Financial Requirements of The Public Sector.

ECONOMIC PARALYSIS, AN INDUCED COMA

The pandemic will set a precedent on the impact on the wellbeing of families, companies, and governments, attributed to an outside factor and not the economy's performance in it of itself. With the outbreak came the economic paralysis from different –non-essential- activities. Just by considering the defined activities by the federal government as non-essential, drawing from the economic census of 2019, it's estimated that 28.5% of the economic units in the country were required to partially close. The latter implied the compromise of 34.1% of labor in the country and 34% of compensation received for their work.

The stated paralysis left the capital contained in companies immobilized. The gross fixed capital formation amounts to 20.1% of the whole country, and the fixed assets found on the paralyzed companies represent 16.9% of the total. In turn, the production value of the stopped economic units represents 22.2% of the total. All the above is equivalent to a body's limb paralysis, as a leg, and the economy is incapacitated to walk as it used to. Those entities whose capital was immobilized had a dramatic fall in their economic activity (Annex Graph 13).

Nevertheless, an economic paralysis for some, to others represents an induced coma. This was the case for Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo's economies given the economic units focused on the tourism industry direct 48% and 73% of their economies fixed assets respectively. Production factors like capital and work have therefore been severely affected by the havoc wreaked by the pandemic, and the differences are significant among different sub-national economies.


It is estimated that 28.5% of the economic units in the country were required to partially close. The latter implied the compromise of 34.1% of labor in the country and 34% of compensation received for their work.

LABOR MARKET COLLAPSE AND THE HARDENING OF EXISTING GAPS

Since the economy's total installed capacity remained unused, the collateral damage were not contained in the labor market. To observe said toll, it is necessary to contemplate the broader conception of unemployment or the labor gap. This conception considers the working-age people (older than 15 years) who are unemployed, need a larger amount of work hours (underemployment), or are available to work, but given the circumstances, it is impossible to look for work.³⁵ The three previous conditions, added to the working people, make the potential workforce of the country.

In the great financial crisis of 2008-2009, the labor gap reached 26.4% in May 2009. From there, a downward yet truly encouraging trend was observed through to January 2020 when it reached 19%. Upon the great closing brought about by the pandemic, the gap reached 52.9% of the workforce in the country in May 2020. By December 2020, the gap was clos-

ing, but it remains high: 30 of each 100 Mexicans are unemployed, did not look for employment, or remain underemployed.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.c (The National Institute of Statistics and Geography)

³⁵ Given that the available people are not looking for work are not considered unemployed, and become part of the non-active economic population.

However, there are vast differences in unemployment given certain economic, regional, and social conditions. By level of education, job insecurity is higher in the cases with lower grades of schooling. By the fourth quarter of 2020, 37 out of 100 Mexicans who did not finish primary school face job insecurity; instead, the people with high school or higher education level are 28%. Said condition is consistent through time. (Graph 15).


The more significant differences are per state and sex. Mexico City is facing the largest labor crisis in modern history: 44 out of 100 city residents were unable to go and search for work, are unemployed, or cannot find the necessary work hours by the fourth quarter of 2020. Conversely, states like Jalisco and Coahuila show lower unemployment rates compared to the national mean (19.8% and 20.5%, respectively) and with lesser differences between men and women. The national labor gap level for men is 27.2% and 34.5% for women. The state of Chiapas is highlighted with the highest difference in labor gap per sex: 23% for men and 41.1% for women. (Annex Graph 16).

For their part, Jalisco has been consistent, maintaining the labor gap under the national mean. (Annex Graph 17).



Image: "Mexico could lose up to 17 million informal jobs: Private Sector" Photo: Roberto García Ortiz at <https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/economia/2020/06/24/mexico-puede-perder-hasta-17-millones-de-empleos-informales-ip-7900.html>

GRAPH 15. LABOR GAP PER EDUCATION LEVEL



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

FULL STOP, NO ACCESS TO A VENTILATOR

In contrast with the 2009 crisis, people in 2020 did not become a part of the informal job market given they could not find any work. This decreased the economically active population. (Annex Graph 18).

With the partial reopening of the sub-national economies, a decrease in people available for work not looking for employment is observed as well as the recovery of the lost formal jobs compared to 2019. However, by December 2020, there are still 3.31 million more people available for work not looking for employment than in 2019. (Annex Graph 19).

The loss of employment had a balanced composition at the beginning of the pandemic, though with more presence in commercial activities (3.32 million on April 2020). Nonetheless, as time went by, different economic sectors have shown better performance, like government and international bodies, social services, extractive industry, and agriculture. But foodservice and hospitality sectors, like professional services, financial and diverse corporate services, explain 71.9% of the loss of employment in December 2020. (Annex Graph 20).



Images: <https://www.touchbistro.com/mx/blog/distanciamiento-social-restaurantes-Covid-19/>

“With ‘saucepans demonstrations’ chefs ask permission to open restaurants in Mexico City” Photo: Cuartoscuro at <https://www.excelsior.com.mx/comunidad/con-cacerolazo-piden-les-permitan-abrir-restaurantes-en-cdmx/1426430>



THE OTHER FACE OF THE CRISIS: WAGE INSTABILITY

The employment scarcity conditions, the decrease of available assets to produce per working-age person, and the excess of unemployed people brought with it a decline in wage mass (total wages received by workers). Despite the extent of the crisis, by December 2020, the total wages of the country's workers are 1.8% below December 2019. In part, this phenomenon is explained by the growth inertia of some federative entities' wage mass before pandemic, which grew 10.2% according to the annual rate in March 2020. (Annex Graph 21).

By the fourth quarter of 2020, Mexico State, Mexico City, Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Veracruz garner 41.3% of the wage mass in Mexico, and for the first time on record, during two consecutive quarters, Mexico City contributes a lower mass wage than Jalisco. (Annex Graph 22).

While some entities in the country contribute to the recovery of wages, others keep negative differences compared to the previous year. The most alarming cases are Mexico City (−1,550.64 million pesos), Mexico State (−1,001.82 million pesos), and Puebla


(−967.46 million pesos). Only five entities keep an upward wage mass trend during two consecutive quarters: Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Nayarit, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas. That is to say, they contribute more and more to the growth of the total wages. Other states like Veracruz and Nuevo León show marked improvements. (Annex Graph 23).

With the reduction of wages received by workers, the income per capita in the country has decreased in real terms in the fourth quarter of 2020 compared to the first quarter of the same year, −.1% (inflation considered) and −8.1% (food basket considered). Another factor caused by the decrease in income is the increase in food prices. (Annex Graph 24).

This has meant more countrymen unable to access the basic food basket. In six states, those with income lower than the food basket doubled compared to the national average relative to the fourth quarter of 2019: Baja California Sur (9.1%), Mexico City (10.5%), Puebla (7.2%), Quintana Roo (14.8%), Tabasco (10.4%), and Tlaxcala (7.7%).

On the national aggregate, the highest working poverty found in Mexico City and Mexico State (5.2%) will have staggering effects on general poverty given they are the most densely populated states in Mexico. (Annex Graph 25).

**RECOVERY OF WAGES
BASED ON GRAPHS 24 AND 25 (ANNEX)**



Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL).

OPEN-HEARTED PRIVATE CONSUMPTION

The decrease of worker's income drove the private consumption contraction in May 2020 (-24.1% annual rate). However, consumption had already shown signs of weakness since December 2019 (-0.2%). This phenomenon was mainly observed in the consumption of domestic goods. (Annex Graph 26).

By November 2020, national goods were found at relative levels from the same month in the past year (-0.9%). The most affected are services, which decreased to a -13.9% annual rate by the month of November 2020. This slow growth is causing the stagnation of private consumption.

In retrospect, it can be observed the fall is prolonged in long-lasting imported goods. The recovery from the 1994 crisis took 16 months, while in 2008, the recovery took a more significant 19 months. Nine months after the Covid-19 crisis started, the consumption of long-lasting imported goods is -3.6% lower than the previous year. Nine months after the pandemic began in Mexico, aggregate consumption is behaving close to the two-prior crises; therefore, it is expected

that the recovery on consumption will take between 13 and 15 months to show favorable growth rates.

For its part, card consumption (debit and credit) is a good indicator to understand consumption on diverse economic activities. It is worth noting that during the last year, variations have been much sharper on private consumption than card spending, both during the pandemic fall as in the subsequent recovery. (Annex Graph 29).

The contraction has focused on some sectors. By January 2021, those establishments related to the touristic sector show a weak recovery. Travel agencies, entertainment, hotels, toll booths, air, and terrestrial passenger transport are found among the most affected, where the loss at the annual rate is 42.5%. There are other affected activities like nursery schools, which in January 2021, had more significant impairment than the outbreak of the pandemic. This should warn authorities in the matter due to the potential long-term social impact.

It is vital to alert about the contraction in family's consumption destined for education in January 2021, as it is estimated that said consumption contracted 18% compared to the annual rate (consumption in nursery schools, basic education, schools, and universities). Due to the fall in family income and continued Covid-19 presence, families likely sacrifice the destined expenses to education. Among them, the nursery school reduction is by far the most compelling (-68.6%) due to the implications that education in the first infancy has on people's adulthood quality of life.

In short, people have reduced their consumption of economic activities related to education and tourism. In contrast, the upward tendency towards health consumption increased (30.2% January 2021 at an annual rate, considering hospital spending, medication, physicians, and dentists).




Image: “Two weeks before starting the school year, one of every five private schools are at risk of closing without support from the Mexican Government to face the crisis, warned Efe representatives” At <https://www.forbes.com.mx/noticias-20-escuelas-privadas-mexico-podrian-cerrar-sin-apoyo-gobierno/>

Due to the fall in family income and continued Covid-19 presence, families likely sacrifice the destined expenses to education.

TABLE 19: CONSUMPTION X-RAY
BEHAVIOR THROUGH CARDS (DEBIT AND CREDIT) (ANNUAL VARIATION), 2018=100

| | | <div>← BETER WORSE →</div> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| CONCEPT | DEC-19 | JAN-20 | FEB-20 | MAR-20 | APR-20 | MAY-20 | JUN-20 | JUL-20 | AGO-20 | SEP-20 | OCT-20 | NOV-20 | DEC-20 | JAN-21 |
| TOTAL AMOUNT OPERATED THROUGH CARDS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Travel Agencies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aggregators | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Insurance Companies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Charity | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Schools and Universities | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fast Food | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Basic Education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Entertainment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Parking Lots | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pharmacies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gas Stations | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Government | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Large Surfaces | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nurseries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hospitals | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Source: In-house elaboration with data from Bank of Mexico (Banxico).

The green color implies a positive variation; conversely, red indicates a decrease. Shades close to yellow are closer to the variable's mean behavior pertaining to the exposed period (December 2019 to January 2021).

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FACING THE CRISIS, THE MAIN SPECTATOR

As it has been shown, companies, people, and families have been severely affected by the pandemic. And in such circumstances, the federal government has decided (on the facts and in some cases explicitly) to forgo their state function to implement a counter cyclical economic policy that minimizes the great closure's havoc as implemented by other countries.

Indeed, the government did not create the crisis. However, it is responsible for what it does or stops doing for the sake of protecting the common interests of those it governs, whether it is entrepreneurs, workers, or public servants (physicians, nurses, and health personnel). According to The Survey on the Economic Impact Generated by Covid-19 on Enterprises (ECOVID-IE) 2020, during the month of April 2020 (the harshest time of the crisis), only 7.8% of companies in Mexico received some sort of help. The most significant benefit by enterprise size, larger enterprises benefited more than the micro-enterprises, 11.5%, and 7.6% respectively. During the summer of 2020, only 6 out of every 100 enterprises in Mexico had support, and the differences in the received sup-

ports by enterprise size were reduced (7.7% large enterprises and 7.6% small and medium-sized enterprises).

According to the same survey, the difference between the large-sized enterprises to the rest is that they received support from diverse non-governmental bodies. Not considering said help, the government support turns out to be similar for the different types of enterprises. In April, the government supported 7 of 100 enterprises in the country. However, by August, the figure fell to 5.4 enterprises of 100. The ratio is the same for all enterprises. (Annex Graph 30).

According to The Telephone Survey on Covid-19 and Labor Market (ECOVID-ML), by the month of July 2020, only 6.6% of the total working population had received some type of support through government programs. The highest figure was 7.9% during June 200. In other words, in the best-case scenario, 8 out of each 100 employed people received some type of support.

By July, roughly 7 of 100 employed women and 6 of 100 employed men received support³⁶ (Anexo Gráfica 31).

By economic sector, support to the tourism industry -one of the most affected by pandemic contingency- is almost null. According to The Federal Expense Budget (PEF) 2021, the Secretariat of Tourism will only count with \$809 million pesos (by subtracting personal ser-

³⁶ The survey does not distinguish from supports through government levels, hence in the best-case scenario this figure expresses the supports given by the federal government.



BUDGETS FOR 2021

**Secretariat of Tourism:
\$809 million pesos**

vices expenses). In contrast, the costs destined to the Mayan Train, one of the federal government's flagship projects, is \$37,083 million pesos, which in the best-case scenario will add to the idle capital of the economy. To put it in perspective: while the tourism industry's market value is roughly \$1.99 mmp, government contribution towards this sector during 2021 is equivalent to 0.04% of the total production.

Likewise, several bodies have been following up on the government's actions towards the crisis generated by Covid-19 worldwide. With information from



**Mayan Train:
\$37,083 million pesos**


Images:

Photo: Carlos Alberto Carbajal/Cuartoscuro at <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/05/23/el-turismo-en-mexico-tardara-en-recuperarse-hasta-2023-preve-el-gobierno/>

Cuahtémoc Moreno EFE at <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-03-18/lopez-obrador-le-otorga-mas-poder-al-ejercito-el-tren-maya-se-ra-patrimonio-militar.html>

the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, it is known that by December 21st, 2020, Mexico was one of the countries with the least number of resources destined to the economy, whether through direct transfers or loans. In a 63-country sample, Mexico occupied number 62, only above Vietnam (by .2%) and below Myanmar's support level.

The amount the Mexican government has invested is equivalent to 0.7% of the GDP. Other countries in Latin America like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have destined 8.3%, 8.2%, and 3.8%, respectively. The support given by the Mexican government through loans or provisions of liquidity is higher than direct transfers (1.3% of the GDP). (Annex Graph 32).




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, International Monetary Fund (IMF).

From the .0.7% of the added government spending to face the crisis, only 0.22% has been destined to additional expenses in health. In comparison with emerging countries, Mexico is highlighted as contributing the least to the crisis in different aspects. The added health spending is just comparable with the additional expenditure in India (.18%).


The pandemic's economic crisis –exacerbated by the federal government's inactivity– does not allow a clear vision of the structural issues that are being created. The unemployment crisis represents an opportunity cost each day that goes by. By December 2020, the gap between potential employment (defined as the employed population added to those that will be added to the economically active population) was 3.96 million people.³⁷ That is to say, the more days that the pandemic crisis is not solved, the more the working-age accumulated people will grow (due to population aging), yet the market will not demand as many jobs as are required to employ all those able to work.

³⁷ The estimation is done through a lagged variable model with a mobile media component. The potential employment is projected by the lag in working age population (till the third order) like the employed population.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

On the investment side, a similar trend can be observed. By the end of 2018, the country's investment began to decelerate and collapsed in 2020. Even before the pandemic, negative growth rates were shown to minus 30% levels in some months of the year through most of the year. The fall of investments does not only affect the fall in GDP in the aforementioned year, but most of all, it affects the economy's growth potential for future years.



Source: BBVA Research (2021). Daily investment Indicators.

Finally, due to the unuse or underuse of the production factors (work and capital), the gap between the potential economic capacity and the current product is -10.4% by 2020's third quarter. This gap means the economy is 10.4% under what it should be producing. Said gap was -20.3% during the second quarter of 2020.

As you can see in the graph below, while the gap reduced after March 2018, it was still positive. Nevertheless, since 2019's third quarter, the gap has been negative (-0.4%). In other words, the economy was growing under its full capabilities two quarters before the pandemic, a trend that has aggravated since.

The loss of potential products dictates what will happen in the future. As of today, not only is the economy bad, as indicated by the income fall, labor poverty, and the consumption decrease, but it will take a long time to recover. Nonetheless, countering the above-mentioned data and information, on February 8th of this year, the president was clear he has a different perspective.



Video 15, Morning press conference, February 8th, 2021, <https://tinyurl.com/4pv7ufh4>

LONG LIVE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S ECONOMY

The economic crisis and the Mexican government's null counter-cyclical policy make the neighboring country's recovery look like the only salvation for Mexico (and Mexicans). Given our tight economic relationship, under the assumption that the federal government will not change its approach toward the economy, the only lifeboat available is the United States of America.

The United States of America's economic recovery comes into play on the Mexican economy through two main mechanisms: remittances (by the fourth quarter of 2020, remittances coming from the United States of America were 94.9% of the total remittances), and exports of manufactured goods and food (from Mexico to the United States of America) (by December 2020 83% of non-oil exports and 81.6% of the total exports were destined for the US).

In 2020 remittances reached a historic record hitting more than \$40 billion dollars. The increase seems to be connected to two factors. First, the support is given by the United States of America to its workers and population in general to palliate the crisis. The North

American aid equated to more than 12% of the GDP compared to Mexico's aforementioned 0.7%. Second, the income reduction in Mexico could have inspired their families in the United States of America to send more resources.


The same North American support to its enterprises, workers, and population, in general, has allowed their economy to fare relatively better than Mexico's. Therefore, since the US consumption did not fall as much as Mexico's, the North American demand for Mexican and other countries' imported goods did not decrease significantly. That is why Mexican exports to the USA began to recover since June 2020, even though their level was lower at 9.3% compared to 2019. However, as the Mexican income fell in 2020, its imports from the USA and other countries contracted by much more at 15.8%. Therefore, Mexico recorded a historic commercial surplus of \$34,476 million dollars in 2020.

Although both mechanisms (remittances and exports) have incidence on the aggregate demand through Mexican families' consumption (by raising family in-

comes) and on exports made by enterprises in Mexico, not all states in the country benefited equally.

By the fourth quarter of 2020, only eight states of the country (25% of the total) received 54.4% of Mexico's remittance income. Jalisco's case is highlighted; not only has its participation increased, but along with Michoacán became the states that received more remittances by the end of 2020, \$1,081.8 million dollars and \$1.087.8 million dollars respectively.


On the export side, 11 entities in the country (34% of the total) export 82.7% of the total goods. And in contrast with the rest of the Mexican economy, the annual export variation of the federative entities pertaining to the third quarter of 2019 is -5.6%. If there is a recovery close to the "V," it is found in the exporting sector in Mexico. The federative entities with the most export capacity will be the most benefitted.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Bank of Mexico (Banxico).

Finally, as has been exposed in prior Vital Signals reports, another leading factor of the Mexican export's recovery is the USA's multiple commercial restrictions imposed on China. What China loses; Mexico, for the most part, wins.

The much bigger support invested by the American government to face the crisis will allow it to have a better performance. This will bring positive effects mainly on the northern, central, and western regions of Mexico. And in some economies in the Mexican southeast will boost private consumption through remittance submissions, which will act as a palliative to the work income fall in Mexico City, Mexico State, and Puebla. Paradoxically, the better export and consumption levels in Mexico previously mentioned are due to the USA economic policy and not to the Mexican federal government's response.



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI. Oil exports are not considered.



The social aftermath of the crisis



<https://www.caracteristicas.co/pobreza-de-mexico/>

THE SOCIAL AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS

All nations around the world have been exposed to the effects of Covid-19. The shock has not only claimed lives, but it has attacked those already lacking wellbeing. At the beginning of 2021, Mexico was among the 15 countries with the most Covid-19 infections, and it was the third Latin American country with more Covid-19 fatalities per million inhabitants (1,036 casualties per million inhabitants). Just by January 22nd, according to official numbers, it was found that a Mexican was dying every 48 seconds due to Covid-19.

SARS-CoV-2 has created pretensions and direct and indirect casualties such as the sanitary collapse associated with the pandemic, the neglect and impairment of primary healthcare due to the prioritization of Covid-19 patients, and the negligence created by the oversight of prevention and early detection of risks and illnesses on the first phase. Death has therefore been the price of health abandonment.



Image: Photo: AP /Christian Chavez at <https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/mexico/coronavirus-mexico-en-vivo-hoy-sabado-20-de-marzo-del-2021-mexico-registra-608-muertes-diarias-por-Covid-19-y-el-total-llega-a-197827-ultimo-minuto-en-directo-amlo-cdmx-noticia/>

MASSIVE IMPOVERISHMENT


The Mexican social inequity subject is not new. The overwhelming social, economic, and sanitary costs left by the Covid-19 pandemic mean that 12 million more people are living in poverty. Even the middle and upper class have suffered a decrease in their quality of life (Vital Signals, 2020d). It is important to highlight that some of the federal government social programs, supplemented by the massive remittances from the USA, buffered Covid-19 impact. Supported income helped temporarily avoiding the fall in consumption. The government advanced support to senior citizens, kept support on farming, and raised the amount of money for student scholarships. At a time where the crisis is present in Mexican pockets, four out of 10 households receive some sort of social support, and 1 out of 2 households (49%) modify their spending behavior around this government help, spending primarily acquiring groceries and in secondary education (Kantar, 2020).

Nevertheless, the social decay that was brewing before and in which poverty had stagnated, had escalated with the government's emphasis on "the poor

first," which implies the problem is just income scarcity and not access to rights. We are facing social collapse. According to CONEVAL estimates, social realignment due to income has affected all social sectors. Only direct transfers from social programs and remittance reception have managed to palliate the crisis marginally. Accordingly, a labor poverty rise is reported during the contingency months exceeding 35.7% in the first quarter of 2020 to 46% in the second, 44.5% in the third quarter, recovering on the last quarter of the year with 40.7% of people with lower income than the food basket.

*We are facing a social collapse.
Working poverty increased from
35.7% to 40.7% of people with a
labor income lower than the cost
of the food basket.*

GRAPH 39: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION WITH LOWER INCOME THAN THE FOOD BASKET COST



Source: In-house elaboration with data from CONEVAL and CEES.

Poverty in Mexico has risen as a consequence of the economic crisis, which has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Nearly 12 million full-time work positions were lost between March and June 2020, from which 1.1 million were formal employments. Out these lost formal employments, 84% had incomes between 1 and 2 minimum wages (CEEMES, Mexican Center of Social and Economic Studies, 2020). This loss is faster and more acute than any other. The lack of employment and its instability will deepen the rise of poverty. According to CONEVAL's last report, the

bearish scenario estimates 70.9 million or 56.7% of the population is income poor.³⁸

Likewise, the report estimates a rise of 6.1-10.7 million people with an income lower to the extreme poverty income line, for a total of 31.7 million Mexicans, or 25.3% of the population. This means that one of every four Mexicans will now suffer extreme poverty

³⁸Report presented by CONEVAL Tuesday, February 9th about the Brief of the Social Development Policy Evaluation (IEPDS) 2020

income.³⁹ Despite the landscape, Mexico lacks policies that effectively tumble poverty, in contrast with Argentina and Brazil, where social assistance significantly counteracts the impact of the economic crisis (Lustig and Martínez, 2020). Similarly, it has been found that the worst effects are not produced in the most poor, but in people within vulnerable groups to fall below the threshold of wellbeing, subjected to adverse impacts like Covid-19 (Lustig y Martínez, 2020).

CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) estimates that Colombia and Mexico will face the highest increase in the number of poor and Argentina and Mexico in the number of extremely poor. Nonetheless, it is also found the amplified social assistance introduced by governments in response to the crisis might have a compensating effect in Brazil and Argentina. On the other hand, in Colombia, relief is very modest. Regrettably, in Mexico, it is non-existent: the federal government has not provided additional help in lieu of the crisis (Lustig y Martínez, 2020).

In this sense, poverty is directly connected with inequality and economic activity, which are also re-

³⁹ This estimate is compared to 2018 data, when 21 million people earned below the extreme poverty line, equivalent to 16.8% of inhabitants.

31.7 million Mexicans fell into poverty and is equivalent to 25.3% of the population. This means that one in four Mexicans will now suffer from extreme income poverty.

flected in health indicators like equality and public action efficiency in health matters (Lustig, 2007). In the Mexican case, the Covid-19 pandemic has not only exposed the health deficiencies but, due to lousy governmental decision making, increased the recovery time in almost all sectors, especially the social one.

The aforementioned social impacts occur when Mexico accumulates more than 2 million confirmed cases of Covid-19 and more than 180 thousand fatalities⁴⁰, hence making it the third country in the world, in absolute numbers, with more pandemic fatalities.

⁴⁰ Cut to February 22 2021. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/s4gvvck>

SOCIAL CRISIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF MENTAL HEALTH

Wellbeing extends to mental health topics. Since poverty and violence deepen, fear, worries, and stress are typical responses in moments of a crisis like the one currently experienced. Understandably, people experience those feelings in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Apart from the fear of contracting Covid-19 are the impact of daily life adjustments to stop and contain the virus spread. There are also the defiant realities like deepening poverty, unemployment, the rise of the domestic violence indexes, as well as the aggravation of inequalities - just some of the factors that threaten our physical and mental health.

With it, physical distancing, work, and the children's education from the household, and the lack of physical contact with loved ones and friends undercut people's spirit and emotions. In an epidemic, it is common for people to be stressed and worried. The typical responses of the affected people (directly or indirectly), warns IFRC (2020), may include:

- » Fear of sickness and dying.
- » Fear of livelihood loss, inability to work due to isolation, and being fired from work.
- » Fear to be socially excluded/sent to quarantine due to association with the sickness (i.e., racism against people coming from affected areas or that are perceived to come from such areas).
- » Impotence feelings to protect loved ones and fear of losing loved ones due to the virus.
- » Fear of being separated from loved ones and caretakers due to the quarantine system.
- » Denial of care to unaccompanied or separated minors, people with disabilities, or senior citizens on account of fear of infection, because the parents or caretakers have been sent to quarantine.
- » Feelings of distress, boredom, loneliness, and depression because of isolation.
- » Fear of reliving an experience from a prior epidemic.

The results of ENCovid-19 show the preponderance of anxiety symptoms present. In April 2020, 32% of the population experienced anxiety, the same percentage demonstrated in August 2020, and slightly decreased by October of the same year to 29%. Meaning, one out of three people has experienced anxiety during the pandemic. The brunt is more serious for people of lower socioeconomic levels, 34% of whom experienced anxiety in October 2020. Conversely, 23% of the upper socioeconomic level people did⁴¹ (ENCovid-19, 2020). This effect is sharper on women (35%) than men (22%).

The depression symptoms monitoring shows the same behavior affecting the poorest households in a higher degree (Socioeconomic level E), where almost 4 out of 10 people (38.06%) experienced depression in October 2020. These households are the most affected, considering that just over half of household spending (52%) is destined for nutrition, and 11% is used for transportation and communication, and a similar percentage destined to housing (AMAI, Mexican Association of Intelligence, Market and Opinion Agencies, 2018).

Those households are typically led by a head of household with a primary level education and the fixed internet trend is practically null (0.2%).

The ratio of people with food security has decreased since the start of the pandemic. According to ENSA-NUT (National Health and Nutrition Survey) (2018), 45% of the population had food security, a percentage that decreased to 39% in April 2020, then to 26% in June and moved to 32% in October of that year. This phenomenon impacts the poorest (low socioeconomic level) the most, since only two out of ten people (22%) had food security, while on upper socioeconomic level, food security was a given for one out of every two people (50%) in October 2020.

⁴¹ ENCovid-19 results October 2020.

EDUCATION: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF A GENERATION

So many and so bad were the news about the pandemic that education was left out of the emergency context. The vital signals of education are not observable since we do not have relevant and timely information to act and much less evaluations of the policies taken so far. Government actions have been limited to the execution of very short-term trivial policies, like closing schools and running the educational band-aid named “Aprende en casa II” (Learn at home II). The educational policy does not count with appropriate resources or a sector program within the long-distance educational strategy frame to face the pandemic, excluding an important risk group of children and youth without digital media access.

Education is one of the most influential factors in the growth and progress of societies and people. In other words, it is the most powerful mechanism any country could have to hold a solid and sustainable economy, an equalitarian and democratic society, as well as citizens above poverty conditions, educational lag, unemployment, violence, and discrimination. The lack of immediate planning to face an uncertain future in educational matters is thus cause for concern.

The signs that signal an educational system disaster indicate that the National Education System will continue operating by inertia and without planning. The educational lag without mitigating policies or extra resources could lead to a generational catastrophe and lost decades of student learning and future professionals if not solved (UNESCO, 2020).



Image: <https://www.milenio.com/politica/aprende-ca-sa-2-sep-horarios-clases-28-septiembre-4-octubre>

THE INTERRUPTION OF EDUCATION

Mexican closing of schools and the rest of the world has been one of the measures taken by governments in an attempt to contain the spread of the virus. Nonetheless, some countries of Asia and Europe managed to reopen educational centers quickly with needed protocols to assure the on-site return.

The concern with on-site attendance at school is driven by the effect of the loss of classes on learning. There is evidence that signals that only in elementary school, a ten-day reduction of classes is connected to a decrease in mathematics and Spanish learning (pertaining to 4 points on mathematics and Spanish results, measured by the former standardized test ENLACE (National Academic Achievement Test in School Centers). This means that not returning to class during the 2019-20 school cycle represented a little more than 60 effective days of class, where learning decreased around 24 points, going from 505 points in a non-Covid-19 scenario to 481 under the effects of Covid-19.



In light of the concern with fatalities around the world, practically from mid-April to mid-June 2020 (when Covid-19 fatalities shot up in some countries), governments opted to keep schools closed. Nevertheless, in the face of learning loss and as the behavior of the virus has been discovered, some other countries decided to open doors to on-site classes with different security protocols.

Image: parents demanded return to school at the Revolution monument on March 20, 2021. The event took place in ten cities across Mexico.

EDUCATION:THE EMERGENCY WITHOUT FUNDS

The educational challenge has led to its recognition as a human right and a sustainable development goal. Objective 4 in the 2030 Agenda (ODS 4, Sustainable Development Goals) comprises the synthesis of education ambitions. However, in Mexico, inclusion, equity, and educational quality have been left adrift under a government where opacity is cheaper at the expense of its students.

Despite the efforts that the sanitary crisis requires and its impact on the educational system, Mexico stands out for the absence of mitigation policies in contrast to Argentina and Brazil (Lustig and Martínez, 2020). Under this framework, a bigger budget for 2021 is not considered and much less an education impact mitigation plan.

Since the Budgetary Project of the Nation Expenditure (PPEF) of the current year, an educational budget of \$836,4 billion pesos (mmp) is proposed. This budget includes no growth for the educational expenditure relative to the Expenditure Budget of the Federation (PEF) of 2020. Moreover, it eliminates 13 budgetary programs (CIEP, Centre for Economic and

Budgetary Research, 2021), exacerbating the inequalities for the most vulnerable, as cut programs include Attention to the Diversity of Native American Education, Migrant School Population Education Care, and Full-Time Schools or Teacher Career in the State Pedagogical University of Sinaloa.⁴² However, other programs show significant surges with the goal of reassigning those resources defined as priorities, which are mainly related to scholarships (CIEP, 2021), as is the case of the program “Jóvenes Escribiendo el Futuro” (Youth Writing the Future).

Part of the concern is school abandonment that would lead children and youth to have fewer working opportunities in the future. The tagged resources lack a strategy framework for distance education required by the pandemic, leaving youth without skills and abilities that allow them to have firm foundations and shape the professionals that will be necessary in the future. The exacerbation of inequality has been present in the technical complications that have ac-

⁴² A large proportion of the programs that were eliminated from the PPEF 2021, were part of basic education, sub-function that focuses the bulk of enrollment of public sustenance students.

TABLE 20: BIGGEST CHANGES IN PROGRAMS PEF 2021

| PROGRAMS | PEF 2021 VS PEF 2020 (%) | PROGRAMS | PEF 2021 VS PEF 2020 (%) |
|--|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| National Program for Men and Women Equality SDN (Defense Secretariat,) | -97.1 | Support to education centers and organizations. | 19.3 |
| Professional Lecturer Development Program | -48.8 | Education policy design | 24.2 |
| Projects of Social Infrastructure on the Educational Sector | -37.9 | Jóvenes escribiendo el futuro | 26.5 |
| National Professional Registry and its partnerships | -37.2 | La escuela es nuestra (The School is ours) | 63.1 |
| Physical Education Excellence | -37.1 | Certification and standardization of working skills | 6,353 |

Source: in-house elaboration with data from CIEP.

companied the learning process under a confinement context that involved distance learning strategies through the “Aprende en Casa II” program.

Said transition brought substantial challenges, like access to information technologies, TV, radio, and the internet for millions of students (Vital Signals, 2020b). This scenario demands extraordinary governmental, social, and above all, economic efforts. Without clarity in the problem scope, the issue was left unresolved by the same “republican austerity”

policy against investments in education to face the crisis.

The National Commission for the Continual Improvement of Education (MEJOREDU) published the survey results on education experiences during the pandemic contingency. The Grupo Reforma drew the survey with Equity and Quality of the Tecnológico de Monterrey, which revealed parents’ opinions on the “Aprender en Casa II” program, leading to the visibility of the consequences of school closing.

The survey results show that the efforts to keep education have been joint, where teachers, students, and parents had to find didactic alternatives to go through the online courses. However, it has found that during the pandemic, only a third of the elementary students and half of junior high had a computer in the household to do their school homework. It also reports that half of the teachers used materials unavailable in the homes of some students. In contrast, the other half expressed that online activities and the TV shows and radio were boring for the students (MEJOREDU).

Unlike other countries, Mexico, has a baseline from SEP survey results (Secretariat of Public Education). According to the evaluation of the survey about “Aprende en Casa II,” 94% of the teachers estimated that it is “positive and unquestionable” that SEP

had started the school cycle 2020-2021 under the long-distance education framework, were supposedly more than 90% graded “a right decision” to broadcast the classes through television (Forbes, 2021).

Despite the loss of learning for millions of children and youth in the country, in Mexico, the classroom’s return has not yet been considered at the time of writing, leaving more days without on-site classes and fewer opportunities to build a better future. This governmental decision to close all schools for so many months was taken without considering the policies followed by other countries.



Social emergency: discrimination and vulnerability



THE PRECARIETY OF LIFE: THE INEXISTENCE OF A PREVENTION CULTURE

Vulnerable groups⁴³ in Mexico have remained in an environment of constant abuse, and the sanitary condition caused by Covid-19 has driven its aggravations. The arrival of the SARS-CoV-2 virus has been a sufficient condition that increased the propensity or risk of vulnerable groups to suffer an impact of various kinds: economic, physical, mental, or emotional. However, there has not been the necessary care for people in these conditions.

Almost 10 years after the reform of Article 1 of the Constitution, which ensures the preservation of human rights and where all forms of discrimination are prohibited;⁴⁴ there has been no additional legislation that perpetuates a social policy with a focus on dis-

⁴³ The CNDH recognizes that issues related to vulnerable groups include migrants, crime victims, missing persons, childhood and family, sexuality, health and HIV, equality between women and men, human trafficking, indigenous peoples and communities, people with disabilities, prison system (person in prison, torture, pronouncements), among others.

⁴⁴ Motivated by ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disability, social conditions, health conditions, religion, opinion, sexual preferences, marital status, or any other that violates human dignity and is intended to nullify or impair the rights and freedoms of people.

crimination. In other words, the Mexican State was legitimized as the main entity responsible for preventing, investigating, punishing, and repairing the violations of established human rights, and several institutions were created. Unfortunately, there has been an institutional weakening of the bodies designed to prevent and treat it, such as the National Institute for the Elderly (INAPAM), the National Council for the Development and Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS), the National Council for Prevention of Discrimination (CONAPRED), and the National System of Integral Protection of Children and Adolescents (SIPINNA). Prevention mechanisms are almost non-existent, and the pandemic has further limited the scope of what was previously being done.

Social support has followed a clientelistic dynamic under this government, which at first looked after vulnerable groups, but in practice, it reformulated the social pact given the intrinsic weakness related to the needs of said vulnerable groups.

According to the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), there are sectors of society in Mexico that,

due to certain conditions or characteristics, are more vulnerable to having their human rights violated. Under this scheme, poverty itself violates multiple human rights, although it is not the only mechanism affecting vulnerable groups.

Social support has followed a clientelistic dynamic under this government.



Image: A person in wheelchair in Mexico City. Photo Cristina Rodríguez at <https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/sociedad/2020/05/02/faltan-avances-legales-para-personas-con-discapacidad-en-mexico-cndh-4591.html>

THE REALITY OF UNPROTECTED GROUPS AND OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY

The form of discrimination that affects the greatest number of people in the world is that of gender, given it affects the rights of more than half of the population (in Mexico, women constitute 51.2% of the total population according to the 2020 Census). This is followed by socio-economic or class discrimination (referring to the number of people living below the poverty line) and in third place is ethnic discrimination (for cultural reasons) and racial discrimination (based on arguments that biologically naturalize the differences between human groups) (ECLAC, 2000).

The image of racism and discrimination in Mexico is portrayed in the National Discrimination Survey (ENADIS). According to the results of 2017, the most frequent reasons for discrimination for women are appearance, religious beliefs, and gender; while for men, it is appearance, the way of speaking, and age.


The disparity in the denial of rights by gender is noted, for example, in the inability to access support from social programs (53.7% for women and 35.3% for men) and medical care or medication (46.9% for women and 39.4% for men). 72% of the population

aged 18 and over believes that the country has little or no respect for the rights of trans people, 66% in the case of gay or lesbian people, 65% in the case of indigenous people, 65% in the case of domestic workers, 58% in the case of people with disabilities, and 57% in the case of the elderly, with the highest percentage believing that their rights are respected little or not at all in the country.

In a country full of victims of all kinds and due to multiple and complex circumstances, the greatest relevance of the federal Executive implies the understanding of the human rights of vulnerable groups and the link between social policy and discrimination. For this, a reliable, transparent, and auditable registry of beneficiaries will be essential, which does not exist, nor is there any plan or will to do so. What exists has root problems (Vital Signals 2020a).

GRAPH 41: DENIAL OF RIGHTS

WOMEN HAVE LESS ACCESS TO SOCIAL PROGRAMS THAN MEN



Notes:

1 This denial refers to the declaration of at least one of the rights captured, which are: medical care or medications, care or services in a government office, entry or stay in a business, shopping center, or bank, receive support from social programs, and obtain a home credit, loan or credit card.

2. The percentages are calculated concerning the total population discriminated for each sex.

Source: In-house elaboration with data from ENADIS 2017

The victims of social policy are added to the victims in the criminal sphere and the administration of justice. It is necessary to rebuild the public apparatus to comply with what was decided 10 years ago in the reform of Article 1 of the Constitution, in favor of the preservation of human rights, for a country that should be the axis of articulation of the national project, seeking a full and dignified life for Mexicans currently at greater risk due to the health crisis.

Two years into the government, with serious implications due to the Covid-19 crisis, the data and information presented in this section corroborate that there are many social deficiencies to solved, even if the government uses data and information to hide or distort the country's reality in this domain.



Energy folly and environmental damage



Photo: Rodrigo Arangua / AFP at <https://tinyurl.com/9b8xethj>

ABANDONMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The health crisis has exposed the great diversity and complexity of problems that were present in Mexico, but that for different reasons had been ignored. Now, these problems are at the center of the discussion, especially those related to health, such as the environment, mainly because its deterioration threatens the living conditions of entire communities as well as the very existence of humanity.

Between 2003-2018, the total costs for depletion and environmental degradation as a GDP percentage went from 7.15% to 4.65% in Mexico, but the downward trend stopped in 2019 when it rose to 4.77%. Meaning that of every 100 pesos produced in the economy, 4.8 pesos are environmental costs so the value of what is produced in the economy is reduced to only 95.2 pesos.⁴⁵ (Annex Graph 42).

Moreover, between 2003-2011, environmental protection expenditures (GPA) as a GDP proportion went from 0.54% to 0.92%, while a proportion of feder-

al government spending went from 3.17% to 4.77%. Starting in 2012, a downward trend in GPA began, which has been accentuated in the last two years. Currently, GPA as a proportion of GDP is equal to 0.45%, and as a proportion of federal government spending, it is 2.29%, about half compared to 8 years ago.


Furthermore, the current federal government does not give the necessary importance to environmental statistics to be able to design appropriate public policies. As can be seen on the website of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), the number of variables updated in the database of the National System of Environmental and Natural Resources Information (SNIARN) has decreased by 86.4%.⁴⁶

The lack of public information on the environmental issue contrasts with the importance given to it by citizens interested in the public issue. As can be seen in

⁴⁵ Without considering capital depreciation.


⁴⁶ The number of updated variables does not correspond to the total information contained in the database.

GRAPH 43: EXPENDITURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS A PROPORTION OF GDP AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING (%)



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Economic and Ecological Accounts of Mexico (INEGI.k).

GRAPH 44: THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES INFORMATION (SNIARN) DATABASE (NUMBER OF VARIABLES UPDATED)



Source: Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) can be viewed at <https://tinyurl.com/y7mv66ue>

the National Development Plan 2019-2024 (p. 210), the number of citizen proposals received through electronic and physical means (without mentioning the exact number per transversal axis) in terms of caring for the environment equals the number of proposals related to corruption. (Annex Graph 45).

ENERGY POLITICS. A BOTTOMLESS PIT

The current government has taken the path of so-called energy sovereignty, understood as self-sufficiency in production. Its policy is based on the rescue of Mexican Petroleum (Pemex) and CFE (Federal Electricity Commission). Said rescue is nothing more than the injection of resources or reducing its tax burden and granting a market monopoly to both companies in different business areas.

In the first case, it is believed that it is possible to achieve said sovereignty by increasing oil production (exploration and production) and gasoline (refining). However, in January 2021, oil production grew by -2.1% at an annual rate and continues its downward trend. No recovery in production levels is in sight. (Annex Graph 46).

Petroleum, in turn, is destined for domestic consumption (for transformation into oil) as well as international consumption (exports). However, as oil production does not show positive growth, either the oil sent to refining is no longer exported, or vice versa; increases in exports imply a decrease in the volume of refining. In January 2021, 58.1% of oil production


was exported, and 42.9% was sent to refining. (Annex Graph 47).

Different products result from the refining process, among which gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil stand out. As of January 2021, the share of the three products represents 71.3% of the total oil production in Mexico.

And for the first time since it has been registered, for six consecutive months (August 2020 to January 2021), the production of fuel oil (residue from the refining process) exceeds the production of gasoline. This is largely due to the deterioration of the refineries.

Therefore, the greater the volume of refining, the greater the production of fuel oil in Mexico. Vital Signals estimates that, on average, for each percentage point that the refining volume increases, fuel oil production increases by 1.85%. Consequently, the option to stop exporting oil and send it to refining is extremely destructive from the economic, environmental, and health standpoints.

GRAPH 48: PETROLEUM PRODUCT MANUFACTURE (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS PER DAY)



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Energy Information System (SIE).

The idea of producing more gasoline is fading. Fuel oil is highly polluting due to its high levels of sulfur and its market is limited due to the multiple environmental restrictions in the world. In Mexico, this oil has been used again in CFE's combined-cycle plants configured to run on natural gas during this government.

Therefore, three factors hinder the increase in gasoline production:

1. Low oil production (historical lows, 1.7 million barrels per day).
2. Given the deterioration of refineries, increasing the volume of oil refining by 1% increases fuel oil production by 1.85%. A fuel oil outlet is required through a large consumer: CFE.
3. Mexico does not have enough installed capacity to supply all the gasoline that the market demands (686,530 barrels per day in 2020), so its importation becomes essential (502,730 barrels per day in 2020). In 2020, imports represented 73.2% of total

gasoline sales in the country. With the opening of gasoline imports by private distributors in 2016, Pemex has lost its presence in the market. As of January 2021, private distributors imported 29.4% of total gasoline.

As a consequence of the above, Pemex has tried to hinder the importation of gasoline by private companies –a fact Vital Signals’ report warned about months ago– to regain the monopoly of its gasoline marketing in Mexico. However, this measure has found not found rulings in favor of Pemex in court.



Image: <https://www.onexpo.com.mx/NOTICIAS/72-GASOLINE-RAS-SON-TRANSNACIONALES-EN-PUEBLA/>




Image: <https://www.elsoldepuebla.com.mx/local/nuevas-gasoline-ras-no-aportan-ventajas-empresarios-de-puebla-1721994.html>



Image: <https://www.oronoticias.com.mx/gasolineras-de-puebla-entre-las-mas-baratas-del-pais/>

GRAPH 49: IMPORT OF GASOLINE IN MEXICO (PEMEX AND PRIVATE SECTOR)



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Energy Information System (SIE).

CFE, NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL

With the suspension of the reform to the Electricity Industry Law approved on March 3, 2021, by Judge Juan Pablo Fierro, the introduction of fuel oil into the domestic market through the CFE is not simple due to the regulatory framework for electricity dispatch. The order in which the electricity distribution for consumption in Mexico is prioritized (dispatch priority) is of the economic type (economic dispatch). This implies that the electricity delivered to homes is always the one with the lowest variable generation cost. For this reason, President López Obrador sent a preferential initiative to Congress to modify the law on the matter and give preference to the electricity generated by CFE, even if it is more expensive and polluting.


During January 2021, the variable costs of generation of the long-term auctions (private sector) are equivalent to only 25.3% of the variable costs of CFE. Or viewed another way, CFE's costs were 4.7 times higher than those of long-term auctions. On the other hand, the generation costs of the combined cycle PIEs (Independent Energy Producers) (electricity generation from natural gas mainly) are equal to 42.2%

of their peers in CFE. In other words, CFE produces at higher costs than private producers, even with the same technology. (See Graph 50).

The least expensive energies are clean energies produced by wind, sun, or water (private sector, hydro-electric, and nuclear-generated by CFE). The most expensive are those produced with fossil fuels, mainly fuel oil, which are from CFE.

The recently approved reform of the Electricity Industry Law (LIE) has its antecedents in various agreements published in early 2020 (Vital Signals 2020f). It is important to specify that this modification has the characteristic of focusing on the generation of electricity. That is, it does not affect other business activities, such as transmission and distribution (activities considered by the Constitution as exclusive to the State).

With the LIE modification, CFE would be given preference in the dispatch of electricity regardless of how old, polluting, and expensive its plants are. In other words, the economic dispatch (lower costs) would be



Source: In-house elaboration with Memoranda data of calculation of basic supply tariffs 2019, 2020, and 2021. Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE by its acronym in Spanish).

replaced by another of the discretionary type in which the costs (environmental and economic) are not relevant. For this, the electricity generated by CFE's hydroelectric and nuclear plants would be attended first, followed by CFE's plants that produce electricity from hydrocarbons, so that towards the end (if it is

not possible to supply the market demand with the CFE supply), energy generated by private companies from the sun and the wind is dispatched. In other words, the environment, health, family economics, and the country would have gone into second place.

It must be noted that during 2019, CFE obtained profits in various subsidiaries, but not in generation, where it presented losses of \$-8.24 billion pesos (at 2013 prices). Only one generation subsidiary obtained profits (Generation V) during 2018 and 2019, which includes the PIEs, which the Federal Executive accuses of corruption for having obtained ad-hoc contracts, once again, without presenting documents or data to corroborate. Without considering the PIE, the generation losses are greater (\$3.7 billion more).

One of the financial consequences that the reform would have had is that generation subsidiaries would have increased their income due to higher rates and increased sales volume. However, its revenues represent costs for CFE's subsidiary, the Supplier of Basic Services, who buys the electricity. In other words, the losses would be transferred from generation to the Supplier of Basic Services (a subsidiary that brings electricity to homes). If the government wants consumer prices to remain fixed, it would have to subsidize the sale of electricity. CFE would increase its presence in electricity generation at no matter what cost, including costs associated with environmental pollution and health.

TABLE 21: FINANCIAL RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTRICITY COMMISSION
(BILLIONS OF PESOS, 2013 = 100)

| CONCEPT | 2018 | 2019 |
|----------------------------|--------|-------|
| Consolidated CFE | 28,76 | 34,09 |
| Generation I CFE | -4,72 | -3,51 |
| Generation II CFE | 3,04 | -0,10 |
| Generation III CFE | -1,72 | -2,24 |
| Generation IV CFE | 0,89 | -0,97 |
| Generation V CFE | 0,01 | 0,00 |
| Generation VI CFE | 11,39 | -1,42 |
| CFE Distribution | -26,41 | 10,37 |
| CFE Basic Service Provider | 24,66 | 24,77 |
| CFE Transmission | 6,75 | 13,88 |

Source: In-house elaboration with data from the 2018 and 2019 Public Accounts.

Based on the above, the following implications of the substitution of economic dispatch by discretionary dispatch stand out:

1. Would generate incentives for the CFE to increase its production through fossil fuels.
2. Would contravene international treaties in which Mexico is a participant. Mainly it is contrary to the USMCA in its chapters of environment and investments.
3. Would generate disincentives to investment in clean energy, especially for private producers.
4. Would increase costs, and surely electricity sales prices. The increase in the costs of CFE's Supplier of Basic Services can be transferred to Mexicans in two ways: increased rates and an increase in subsidies. This implies that Mexicans would pay either as users of a polluting service with higher rates; as taxpayers, since it would be necessary to compensate for a possible increase in subsidies; or as a consumer of public goods and services, it would be necessary to transfer more resources to CFE, to the detriment of the quality or quantity of other public goods and services, such as medicines or public safety.

Whith the new law CFE would be given preference in the dispatch of electricity regardless of how old, polluting, and expensive its plants are; the environment, health, family economics, and the country would have gone into second place.



Image: <https://www.tendencias.mx/produccion-petrolera-cerro-mayo-con-1-65-millones-de-b-d/>

SELF-SUPPLY PERMITS

Another of the most relevant aspects of LIE's modification was to review the self-supply permits. This figure was created at the beginning of the 90s to increase the country's competitiveness in strategic economic sectors such as manufacturing and mining. Private producers were thus allowed to self-supply electricity without electricity generation being their main activity.

According to the 2019 Economic Censuses, only one in 100 establishments in the country have equipment for their own energy generation. But that small percentage participates with 4.4% of the total gross production in the country, concentrates 5.6% of fixed assets, 6.1% of total remuneration, the average remuneration per person is 67.2% higher than the national average, and the average rate of return is 61.5% against a national average of 31%. The majority (56.2%) of these companies are concentrated in activities such as retail trade, manufacturing industries, and accommodation services. (Annex Graph 51).

Of the 4.4% of its contribution to the gross product in the country, companies related to the manufacturing industry contribute the most (41.4% of the total), followed by corporations (21.2%) and mining (15%). (Annex Graph 52).

The effect of revising the self-supply agreements on some companies established in Mexico would have serious implications since it threatens to reduce their competitiveness in the international market. Furthermore, by reducing the supply of clean energy, some companies would fail to comply with their objectives of caring for the environment and with the provisions of the USMCA on environmental matters.


This is particularly relevant in cement, mining, car assembly companies, self-service stores, and all those with international commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Even subnational governments, such as Tamaulipas, would have been affected since they have self-supply permits.



Images: “CEMEX will build a solar park in Zacatecas” at <https://manufactura.mx/energia/2018/11/16/cemex-construira-un-parque-solar-en-zacatecas>

“Walmart goes solar with panels in their roofs” in noticiasambientales.com at <https://tinyurl.com/8w8553c6>

GRAPH 53: FIFTEEN COMPANIES (PRIVATE AND STATE GOVERNMENTS) WITH THE HIGHEST MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DEMAND (MW) WITH SELF-SUPPLY PERMITS



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE).

IMPACTS ON INVESTMENT

As of December 2020, the accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) in the electricity industry in Mexico amounts to \$36.097 billion dollars. (Annex Graph 54).


With the energy reform implementation in the previous administration, FDI in the electricity industry had grown at rates higher than that of all the sectors. However, as of 2019, FDI decreased considerably to 4.7% compared to 21.4% a year earlier. Despite the uncertain environment, total FDI growth during 2020 was 2.1%. (See Graph 55).

The Bartlett Law or Fuel Oil Law which was suspended, as it is called, would constitute a value chain full of destruction. It would destroy the incentives to invest in Mexico, would destroy installed capacity by allowing the decapitalization of companies, would put Mexico's relationship with other countries (especially the United States and Canada) at risk, would destroy the environment, and, above all, would affect the health of Mexicans by breathing dirtier air. And finally, they would pay the high cost of CFE's electricity generation through taxes, tariffs, or by

consuming lower-quality public goods and services. According to the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), the cost in economic matters, only accounting for FDI, amounts to \$36.1 billion dollars, and the investment in self-supply permits already made amounts to \$26.86 billion dollars.

As of 2019, FDI decreased considerably to 4.7% compared to 21.4% a year earlier. Despite the uncertain environment, total FDI growth during 2020 was 2.1%.

GRAPH 55: ANNUAL VARIATIONS OF TOTAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) (IN DOLLARS)
AND THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY FDI



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Secretariat of Economy.



Disputed relations and borders



THE SEARCH FOR THE VACCINE









After a devastating year with marked negative impact on health, economy, educational, and poverty, at the beginning of 2021, international relations are marked by a race to obtain some of the vaccines already on the world market. With the sole purpose of verifying that the vaccines' effectiveness is truly what laboratories indicate, dozens of countries hope to buy and immunize their population to begin a full recovery from the crisis brought on by the pandemic as soon as possible.

Vaccination to combat SARS-CoV-2 will be how some countries will determine the future of international relations. Germany, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, among other countries, are in a race to conquer markets by selling their vaccines. There is not, at the moment, a market regulating authority for both the sale and the supply of vaccines. Consequently, beyond an economic benefit from this transaction, it is expected that allies will be gained and relations with countries around the world will be strengthened.


Mexico is not part of the select group of countries that produces these vaccines. On the contrary, given its enormous lack of support and impulse in the health, science, and technology sectors, Mexico is waiting to be able to acquire them little by little, or in the worst of cases, for many countries to sympathize and donate some of the surplus amounts. By not having a timely, proven, and relevant strategy to face the pandemic, the country is in a condition of dependency to find a route to recovery. (See Table 23).

Mexico is not part of the select group of countries that produces these vaccines. On the contrary, given its enormous lack of support and impulse in the health, science, and technology sectors, Mexico is waiting to be able to acquire them little by little.

TABLE 22: LIST OF VACCINES AGAINST COVID-19: NUMBER OF DOSES, EFFECTIVENESS, AND COUNTRIES THAT ACQUIRED IT

| | COUNTRY | VACCINE NAME | NO. OF DOSES | EFFECTIVENESS | COUNTRIES TO WHICH THE VACCINE IS BEING DELIVERED |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|---------------|--|
|  | United Kingdom | Oxford / AstraZeneca | 2 | 62-90% | The United Kingdom, European Union countries, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, United States, India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Egypt, Argentina, Canada, Russia, Kenya, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Israel, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, Panama, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Peru, Venezuela, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Mainland China, Jordan, Vietnam, India, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Morocco, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Moldova. |
|  | United States of America | Moderna | 2 | 95% | Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, and Panama. |
|  | United States of America- Germany | Pfizer | 2 | 95% | Canada, United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Australia, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, Panama, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, mainland China, and Jordan. |
|  | Russia | Sputnik V | 2 | 92% | Brazil, India, MEXICO , United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Panama, Iran, Serbia, Hungary, Palestine, Turkmenistan, and Armenia. |
|  | United States of America | Novavax | 2 | 89,3% | The United Kingdom, European Union countries, South Africa, MEXICO , Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, United States, India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Egypt, Argentina, Canada, Russia, Kenya, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Israel, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, Panama, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Peru, Venezuela, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Mainland China, Jordan, Vietnam, India, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Morocco, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Moldova. |
|  | United States of America | Johnson & Johnson | 2 | 66% | Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, and Panama. |
|  | China | Sinovak | 2 | 49,62% | Canada, United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Australia, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, South Korea, Kuwait, Taiwan, Panama, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, mainland China, and Jordan. |
|  | China | Sinopharm | 2 | 79,34% | Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, MEXICO , Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Mainland China, and Jordan. |

Source: Own elaboration with data from BBC (2020), The New York Times (2020), and Sputnik V (2021).



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the World Bank, (2018).

Priorities are elsewhere. With the continued financing of projects such as the Dos Bocas refinery, the Mayan Train or the Felipe Ángeles Airport, President López Obrador is burying both the promises he made during his 18-year campaign, as well as the expectations that the country may have had, to overcome the bitter pill of Covid-19.

TABLE 24: INVESTMENT AMOUNT ALLOCATED IN 2021 TO THE PROJECTS: MAYA TRAIN, DOS BOCAS REFINERY, SANTA LUCIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND VACCINES AGAINST COVID-19

| | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
|  |  |  |  |
| <p>MAYAN TRAIN</p> <p>>36 BILLION PESOS</p> | <p>DOS BOCAS REFINERY</p> <p>> 45 BILLION PESOS</p> | <p>SANTA LUCIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT</p> <p>> 21 BILLION PESOS</p> | <p>Covid-19 VACCINES</p> <p>> 32 BILLION PESOS</p> |

Source: Source: In-house elaboration based on data from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2021), Bazán (2020), and El Economista (2020).

Images:

<https://piedepagina.mx/concede-juez-suspension-definitiva-al-tramo-dos-del-tren-maya/> <https://www.milenio.com/negocios/dos-bocas-como-va-la-construccion-de-la-refineria-al-21-de-septiembre>
<https://www.milenio.com/negocios/dos-bocas-como-va-la-construccion-de-la-refineria-al-21-de-septiembre>
<https://www.pasala.com.mx/noticias/ciudad/toma-forma-el-nuevo-aeropuerto-internacional-felipe-angeles>
<https://thelogisticsworld.com/logistica-y-distribucion/logistica-de-la-vacuna-contra-el-Covid-19-en-mexico-aplicara-6-mil-dosis-por-dia/>

FIRST ADJUSTMENTS IN MEXICO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

The arrival of Joe Biden to the White House still represents hope for Mexico to force itself to change many of the decisions that are being taken at a critical time for the country and the world. However, the outlook is not positive for the future as the relationship between Mexico, and the United States is in a very difficult moment. The lack of adequate and relevant communication channels has been reflected in at least three important areas: 1) the migration crisis on the northern border, 2) the Central American triangle and its migrants, and 3) the imminent changes in security, energy, environment, and commerce.

One of the clearest examples of this crisis is the “Remain in Mexico” or “Stay in Mexico” program, which came into effect on January 29, 2019, at former United States President Donald Trump’s initiative. Although suspended by the mandate of President Joe Biden, the program has produced alarming numbers. According to the American Immigration Council (2021), at least 70,000 people were returned to Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP).



Image: <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/02/22/espanol/el-largo-y-sinuoso-camino-de-la-detencion-a-la-deportacion-de-estados-unidos.html>

Likewise, according to the Report “In the Wolf’s Mouth,” prepared by the Foundation for Justice and the Democratic State of Law, Doctors without Borders reported that 68% of the refugees and migrants benefiting from the care programs were victims of multiple forms of violence, including sexual violence. Simultaneously, the Human Rights First (HRF) organization said it had registered more than 800 violent attacks against asylum seekers, including cases of rape and murder and the crime of kidnapping in exchange for ransom, where at least 200 minors under age were affected. Furthermore, the report mentions that between November 2019 and January 2020 alone, 80 kidnappings and 19 attempted kidnappings of asylum seekers incorporated into the “Stay in Mexico” program were documented.

The National Human Rights Commission also documented, between September 2019 and February 2020, at least 32 testimonies of migrant victims of crimes by organized crime, state and federal police, in six immigration stations and provisional detention rooms, as well as in 12 civil society shelters in the North, Center, and South of the country. Unfortunately, and still fully aware of the human rights violations, the CNDH has

decided to keep the issue hidden and not mention it in any of its reports.⁴⁷

In this way, the Central American triangle and its migrants are a red flag. Since March 2020, the US author-

⁴⁷ Article by *Animal Político* based on documents they accessed <https://tinyurl.com/y3m9jyqk>

Image: <https://desinformemonos.org/impunidad-principal-causa-violencia-migrantes-mexico/>



ities deport migrants at any time and at any border point because the government authorized Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to use the instructions of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to reject the border asylum-seeking migrants to prevent the spread of Covid-19. Under this order, the US authorities have carried out more than 390,000 deportations along the border with Mexico, including at least 1,470 were minors, and allowed the agents to not carry out the normal immigration procedures and quickly return almost 90% of migrants. According to Animal Político (2021), the points at which the most Central Americans have been deported are Reynosa, Tamaulipas, with 10,957 returns; Sonoyta, Sonora, with 1,185; and Puerto Palomas, Chihuahua, with 654. These are some of the most remote and dangerous places, and even so, they were the most used for the deportation of migrants, plus the fact that it is unknown whether they were accompanied or abandoned.

With Biden, more changes are expected in immigration matters, in addition to the cancellation of the “Stay in Mexico” program, an action that international organizations have applauded. Likewise, the U.S. Citizenship Act immigration reform plan has been discussed, which seeks to give a pass to citizenship to more than 10 million undocumented immigrants.

For Mexico, there will be imminent changes in security, energy, environment, and trade with the arrival of Joe Biden to the White House. In terms of security, the most noteworthy will be in reference to the treatment of arms and drugs in the bilateral relationship, especially in light of the figures and understanding that the sale of drugs in the US reaches \$150 billion dollars per year. According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2020), more than 90% of the heroin seized and sampled in the United States comes from Mexico. In contrast, between 2009 and 2019, around 2 million illegal weapons entered Mexico, of which 70% came from the United States, making it an issue that needs cooperation and urgent attention from both sides.

The bilateral relationship with the new president Biden begins with an uncomfortable affair. Given the mismanagement of the Mexican authorities to clarify the true situation of General Cienfuegos, cooperation on security matters may hinder the fluidity with which these issues should be handled. Despite the Mexican Foreign Minister, Marcelo Ebrard’s affirmation that “it would be very costly for Mexico to have the conversation with the United States for the charges against a former secretary in this case of Defense to be dismissed and have him returned to Mexico and

then do nothing, that would be almost suicidal. For that outcome, it would be better not to say anything and let him stay there”, the FGR (Attorney General of Mexico) decided not to prosecute.

President Biden represents a 180-degree turn from his predecessor when it comes to environmental and climate change issues. Within his first hours in the office, the United States returned to the Paris Agreement against climate change. And consequently, it is expected that some of the Mexican projects that are underway can be studied and audited to ensure, with scientific and technological criteria, that they comply with the international standards considered in the USMCA.

In terms of energy, Biden and AMLO present antagonistic positions. The government of Mexico has hardened its energy policy, directing it to the intensive use of petroleum products highly harmful to the environment and health. This is the case of fuel oil, whose increase has been 55.2% between December 2018 and January 2021 and its participation in the total of petroleum products has increased 4.4%. Until now, Mexico has not prioritized its commitments to climate change and the commitment proposed for 2024, where it was expected that 35% of the energy

consumed would come from renewable plants. In its latest report, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that only 22.9% of the total energy in Mexico is generated in plants considered clean. It will be a subject of special attention since, in his government plan, Biden speaks of “a more integrated energy network from Mexico through Central America and Colombia, supplied by increasingly clean energy.”⁴⁸

The Policy of Reliability, Security, Continuity, and Quality in the National Electric System was published by the Ministry of Energy (SENER) on May 15, 2020. The Supreme Court of the Nation invalidated 22 provisions of said policy after a constitutional controversy promoted by the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFEEC).

In terms of energy, Biden and AMLO present antagonistic positions. Mexico has not prioritized its commitments to climate change and the commitment proposed for 2024, that 35% of the energy consumed would come from renewable plants.

⁴⁸ Joe Biden defiende el paquete legislativo conocido como el ‘Green New Deal’, que propende por enfrentar los desafíos climáticos.

They argued that it invaded the powers of COFECE itself, in addition to violating the right to free competition and giving an undue advantage to the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). More recently, Congress passed the initiative of a series of reforms to the Electricity Industry Law in which preference is given to the Federal Electricity Commission in the dispatch of energy over cheaper and cleaner sources. Numerous national and international lawsuits are expected against this new attempt by the government to benefit the state monopolies, in clear opposition to the Constitution and the USMCA itself.

The export sector seems to be the only one that could boost the recovery of the economy. With the support provided by the US government to its economy in the face of the damage caused by the pandemic, Mexico's export and remittances sector has benefited.

In 2020, Mexico registered a trade surplus, and Banco BASE expects Mexican exports to grow 12.3% next year, and Barclay's diagnosis is 18% per year, while Intercom predicts that they will grow in double digits.



Image: Washington Alves/Reuters at <https://expansion.mx/empresas/2020/05/25/sector-automotriz-pide-gobierno-puebla-iniciar-operaciones>

While it is true that the relationship with the United States represents a very strong and extensive link in Mexico's foreign policy, it cannot continue to be the only front that is being addressed. Mexico needs to be an active actor again through the various international organizations of which it is a part. In these two years, it has had null or little participation, such as the G20, the Pacific Alliance, and the United Nations. Especially now, since it has a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2021, which represents an opportunity to be seen positively and begin to recover the position of a leading country in international relations, at least as far as Latin America is concerned.

Images:

logotypes of TransPacific Alliance, G20 and Security Council of the United Nations.



Conclusions



CONCLUSIONS

This Vital Signals report seeks to demonstrate the balance in terms of progress, challenges, and setbacks faced in the country, as well as how the government of the fourth transformation has been facing them. After two years of government, at the beginning of the third year of administration, the quantifiable and measurable results that the federal government has given are scarce. However, some actions and policies were found that have positively impacted their areas of influence. Nonetheless, much of the content of this report confirms that millions of Mexicans are still waiting to feel improvements in governance, income, energy, environment, security, and social needs such as health and education.

Truth is a human value that refers to the coincidence that exists between a statement and reality (Merriam Webster, 2020). The absence of any of these components compromises honesty, good faith, or human sincerity. This report demonstrates the permanent recurrence of President López Obrador to lie, to “the other data,” the half-truths or the accusations without supporting evidence. Thus, the way in which the

government has manipulated information in practically the entire period of President López Obrador’s administration reveals the lack of truth in his actions. With insufficient and incorrectly designed plans and projects, the country is guided and oriented based on indications that the president may have each morning in his press conferences. It seems that President López Obrador governs from communication and not from public action with programs, projects, and accountability.

The pandemic’s wear and tear have been an element that has slowed any growth expectations for the country’s development. However, there have been indications that although the onslaught of the virus has distorted rescue plans around the world, there are countries that have managed to intelligently manage the aftermath of Covid-19. In Mexico, the concentration of power and decision-making, apart from science and expert knowledge, has repercussions on the federal government’s bad decisions. The perverse alliances that have been generated from the Executive Power with the Legislative and Judicial

Powers have led to solutions, as well as any of the possible recovery routes, becoming increasingly distant for millions of Mexicans.

Many of the vital signs that we have considered as priorities throughout the report indicate the lack of results due to the lack of planning to face the hundreds of problems faced before and during the pandemic. Central issues such as the rule of law, militarization, pandemic management, and economic growth, the transition to clean energy production, educational improvement, poverty alleviation, and a better national health system are warning signs that measure the precarious strategy to confront them within government structures.

The style and form of President López Obrador's government, characterized by going against any of the policies and actions of previous administrations, has caused a setback in various areas. There is evidence that the pandemic remains uncontrolled. There is a greater number of poor people in the country; millions of girls, boys, and young people have been forced to abandon their studies; thousands of businesses have closed due to lack of support to strengthen their permanence; thousands of women have seen their human rights and individual guarantees violated by

not having the support of the law, and the list seems endless.

Finally, a vital sign that is still active, and that gave rise to this organization, is to integrate the quality and veracity of the information that the Mexican government generates and disseminates into the analysis. It is not acceptable for the government to try to substitute "its truth" for reality, manipulating and spreading false or misleading information, which does not allow society to make adequate and accurate decisions regarding the planning of a better future for each of its members. As a result, this report shows that the government headed by López Obrador is in debt to the country and its entire population, whether they are supporters of his government or openly opposed to it. Compared to the actual achievements, the promised goals are far from an efficient, effective, equitable, and transparent government.



Annex




TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|--|--------------------|---|------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS WITH POSITIONS OF SECRETARIES OF SECURITY, STATE AND MUNICIPAL | | | | | | |
| Baja California Sur | Los Cabos | Directorate of Public Safety, Preventive Police and Municipal Traffic | Juan José Zamorano | Captain | Director of Public Safety | 9/3/2019 |
| Baja California Sur | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Germán Wong López | Ship Captain | Secretary of Public Safety | 2/7/2018 |
| Baja California Sur | Loreto | Directorate of Public Safety, Preventive Police and Municipal Traffic | Carlos Lenin López Torres | Ship Lieutenant | Director of Public Safety | 10/17/2019 |
| Baja California Sur | Mulegé | Directorate of Public Safety, Preventive Police and Municipal Traffic | Lizandro Castan Melchor | Ship Lieutenant | Director of Public Safety | 2/19/2019 |
| Baja California Sur | La Paz | General Directorate of Public Safety and Municipal Traffic | Omar Armando Valdéz Neria | Corvette Captain | Director of Public Safety | 10/4/2018 |
| Jalisco | Puerto Vallarta | Public Security Police Station | Fernando Viveros Hernández | Ship Captain | Head | 1/18/2021 |
| Morelos | State | State Public Safety Commission | José Antonio Ortiz Guarneros | Vice admiral | Secretary of Public Security of the State | 10/1/2018 |
| Nuevo León | Doctor Coss | Secretary of Public Safety and Roads | Francisco Leónides Cruz | Retired Army Sergeant | Secretary of Public Safety and Roads Doctor Coss (assassinated on November 24) | (undated) |
| Nuevo León | Escobedo | Secretariat of Public Security | Hermelindo Lara Cruz | Retired Brigadier General | Escobedo Public Safety Secretary | 11/1/2019 |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|--|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS WITH POSITIONS OF SECRETARIES OF SECURITY, STATE AND MUNICIPAL | | | | | | |
| Puebla | Atlixco | Secretariat of Public Security | Enrique Jaime Tapia Espinoza | Retired Lieutenant Colonel | Secretary of Public Safety | 6/27/2019 |
| Sonora | Guaymas | Secretariat of Public Security | Andrés Humberto Cano Ahuir | Captain | Director of Public Safety | 8/21/2019 |
| Sonora | Empalme | Secretariat of Public Security | Luis Alberto Taylor | Ship Lieutenant | Commissioner General of Public Security | 15/4/2020 |
| Sonora | Cajeme | Secretariat of Public Security | Cándido Tarango Velázquez | Capitain | Secretary of Public Safety | (undated) |
| Tamaulipas | Estatat | Secretariat of Public Security | José Jorge Ontiveros Molina | Captain | Secretary of Public Security of the State | 7/20/2020 |
| Veracruz | Coatepec | Public Security Directorate | Cruz Alfredo Morales Castillo | Ship Captain | Director | 8/1/2019 |
| Veracruz | Veracruz | Director of Public Safety | Carlos García Cruz | Captain | Director | (undated) |
| MILITARY ELEMENTS WITH OTHER POSITIONS IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS | | | | | | |
| Baja California Sur | La Paz | Municipal police | Armando Valdéz | Corvette Captain | Director of the Municipal Police | 8/12/2019 |
| Campeche | State | Secretariat of Public Security | José Luis Castañeda Vega | Corporal | Deputy Director of the SSP | 7/22/2020 |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|--|--------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS WITH OTHER POSITIONS IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS | | | | | | |
| Campeche | State | Secretariat of Public Security | José Luis Castañeda Vega | Commander | Deputy Director of the SSP | 7/22/2020 |
| Colima | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Carlos Jesús Miravete | Jurisdictional Analyst of the Fourth Naval Region | Undersecretary of Operations | 6/18/2020 |
| Colima | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Fernando Troncoso Torres | General Director of Private Security of the State of Puebla | Director-General of Auxiliary Police | 6/18/2020 |
| Estado de México | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Sergio Hernando Chávez García | Retired Army General | Undersecretary of State Police | 2/1/2018 |
| Federación | Federal | National Intelligence Center (CNI) | Audomaro Martínez Zapata | Retired Army General | Managing Director | 12/1/2018 |
| Hidalgo | State | Professional Training Institute of the Ministry of Public Security | Miguel Ángel Zimbrón | Lieutenant | Director | (undated) |
| Hidalgo | State | General Directorate of Internal Supervision and Inspection | Alberto Téllez Girón Gutiérrez | Captain | Head | (undated) |
| Morelos | State | Executive Secretariat of the State Public Security System | José Manuel Rodríguez Morales | Rear Admiral | Executive Secretariat of the State Public Security System | 10/1/2018 |
| Sonora | Hermosillo | Municipal police | Gilberto Landeros Briseño | Retired Major General of the General Staff | Commissioner-General | 8/15/2019 |
| Sonora | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Erwin Martín Romero Salcedo | Lieutenant Colonel | Operations coordinator | 6/20/2020 |

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| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|--|--------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS WITH OTHER POSITIONS IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS | | | | | | |
| Sonora | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Alfonso Novoa Novoa | Captain | General Commissioner of the State Police of Public Security | 2/6/2020 |
| Tamaulipas | State | State Police | Rodrigo Bautista | Lieutenant | Head of State Delegation in the South Zone | 8/27/2019 |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Cuahtémoc Zúñiga Bonilla | Ship Captain | Undersecretary of Operations | 7/17/2019 |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Juan Sánchez Alvarado | Rear Admiral | Director of Intermunicipal Operations | (undated) |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Laureano Suárez Allen | Vice admiral | General Director of Prevention and Social Reintegration | 5/8/2019 |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Luis Enrique Torres Campos | First Master | General Director of the Civil Force | (undated) |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | José Antonio Camps Valencia | Corvette Captain | General Director of Traffic and Road Safety of the State | 3/25/2019 |
| Veracruz | State | Secretariat of Public Security | Evaristo Cru Cabañas | Rear Admiral | General Director of the Training Institute "Center for Studies and Research in Security" | (undated) |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|---|--------------------|---|----------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS | | | | | | |
| Federation | Federal | Administration and Finance of the Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE) | Jens Pedro Lohmann Iturburu | Commander of the IV Military Region, in Mty, NL | Director | 4/1/2019 |
| Veracruz | State | Pension Program for Older Adults in the Veracruz region | José Manuel Solano Ochoa | Retired Vice Admiral | Regional delegate for Wellness programs | (undated) |
| Guerrero | State | Directorate General of Traffic, Roads, Ports, and Airports of the State | Roberto Antonio García Bello | Lieutenant Colonel | Managing Director | 25/7/2018 |
| Nuevo León | Monterrey | Metrorey Collective Transportation System | Lorenzo Aguilar Camelo | Retired Major of the Mexican Army | Director of the Metrorey Security area | 7/1/2018 |
| Tamaulipas | Tampico | Ministry of Traffic and Roads | René Naranjo Sánchez | Ship Lieutenant | Head | 1/27/2020 |
| Federal | Federal | Federal Civil Aviation Agency | Carlos Antonio Rodríguez Munguía | Division General | Managing Director | 2/1/2021 |
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MIGRATION | | | | | | |
| Aguas-calientes | State | National Migration Institute | Pedro León Álvarez Alca-cio | Brigadier General Construction Engineer licensed by the General Staff | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Campeche | State | National Migration Institute | Roberto González López | Vice admiral | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Chiapas | State | National Migration Institute | Aristeo Taboada Rivera | Brigadier General Licensed by the General Staff | Representative office Head | 11/3/2020 |
| Chihuahua | State | National Migration Institute | Pedro Alberto Alcalá López | General | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|--|--------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MIGRATION | | | | | | |
| Coahuila | State | National Migration Institute | José de Jesús Barajas Santos | Division General air staff certified aviator pilot | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Colima | State | National Migration Institute | Ramón Juárez Suárez | Vice Admiral | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Estado de México | State | National Migration Institute | Efraín Sánchez Velasco | Brigade General licensed by the general staff | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Guanajuato | State | National Migration Institute | Enrique Aviña Gutiérrez | Brigade General licensed by the general staff | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Guerrero | State | National Migration Institute | Víctor Manuel Martínez Maya | Rear Admiral | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Hidalgo | State | National Migration Institute | Francisco Javier Hernández Sánchez | First Cavalry Cap- tain | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Michoacán | State | National Migration Institute | Salomón Maldonado Silva | Brigade General licensed by the general staff | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Jalisco | State | National Migration Institute | Pedro Valencia Salcedo | Division General | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Nayarit | State | National Migration Institute | Miguel Ángel Nophal Bal- deras | Brigade General | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Puebla | State | National Migration Institute | Jose Luis Chávez Aldana | Brigade General licensed by the general staff | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE


| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|---|--------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MIGRATION | | | | | | |
| Sinaloa | State | National Migration Institute | Genaro García Wong | Brigade General licensed by the general staff | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Sonora | State | National Migration Institute | Salvador González Guerrero | Rear Admiral | Representative office Head | 3/17/2020 |
| Veracruz | State | National Migration Institute | Raúl Alberto Paredes Hernández | Rear Admiral | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| Yucatán | State | National Migration Institute | Juan Saucedo Almazán | Brigadier General Licensed by the General Staff | Representative office Head | 8/21/2019 |
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE COMPREHENSIVE PORT ADMINISTRATIONS | | | | | | |
| Baja California Sur | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Manuel Fernando Gutiérrez Gallardo | Captain in deep fishing | Managing Director | 8/14/2020 |
| Chiapas | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Aurelio Antonio Argüelles | Admiral | Managing | 8/18/2020 |
| Colima | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Salvador Gómez Meillón | Admiral | Managing | 9/2/2020 |
| Jalisco | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Víctor Francisco Uribe Arévalo | Admiral | Managing | 8/7/2020 |
| Michoacán | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Jorge Luis Cruz | Admiral | Managing | 9/2/2020 |

TABLE 8: MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

| STATE | SCOPE/MUNICIPALITY | INSTITUTION/UNIT | NAME | LEVEL OBTAINED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES | CURRENT POSITION | DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICE |
|---|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE COMPREHENSIVE PORT ADMINISTRATIONS | | | | | | |
| Sinaloa | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Mariel Aquileo Ancona | Rear Admiral | Managing Director | 9/2/2020 |
| Tabasco | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Gregorio Martínez Núñez | Vice admiral | Managing Director | 9/2/2020 |
| Tamaulipas | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Miguel Báez Barrera | Vice admiral | Director General de API Tampico | 8/10/2020 |
| Tamaulipas | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Óscar Miguel Ochoa Gorena | Captain in deep fishing | Director General de API Altamira | 8/10/2020 |
| Veracruz | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Romel Eduardo Ledezma | Admiral | Managing Director | 2/9/2020 |
| Veracruz | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Nicodemus Villagómez Broca | Vice admiral | Managing Director | 8/10/2020 |
| Yucatán | Federal | Comprehensive Port Administrations | Jorge Carlos Tobilla | General Staff Logistics Administrator (SEMAR) | Managing Director | 8/18/2020 |


Source: In-house elaboration with information from Common Cause, (2020).

GRAPH 13: ANNUAL VARIATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY PER STATE VS. NON-ESSENTIAL FIXED ASSETS PERTAINING TO THE TOTAL PER STATE




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the economic census of 2019, Federal Official Gazette (DOF), and the Quarterly Economic Activity Indicator (ITAEE). The total of fixed assets destined for tourism was considered on the Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo cases.

GRAPH 15: LABOR GAP PER EDUCATION LEVEL




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

GRAPH 16: LABOR GAP PER STATE AND SEX (FOURTH QUARTER 2020)




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

GRAPH 17: LABOR GAP PER STATE (FOURTH QUARTER 2019 - FOURTH QUARTER 2020)




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

GRAPH 18: ANNUAL VARIATION OF LABOR INFORMALITY AND LABOR GAP (MILLIONS OF PEOPLE)




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

**GRAPH 19: ANNUAL VARIATION (MILLION OF PEOPLE)
OF WORKING AND AVAILABLE POPULATION
NOT LOOKING FOR EMPLOYMENT**




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.

GRAPH 20: ANNUAL VARIATION (MILLIONS OF PEOPLE) OF WORKING POPULATION PER ECONOMIC SECTOR




MILLIONS OF PEOPLE



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.


GRAPH 21: WAGE MASS ANNUAL VARIATION (%) IN MEXICO 2010=100

% ANNUAL VARIATION
SALARY MASS




Source: In-house elaboration with data from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL). Due to the sanitary crisis, there's no data for the second quarter of 2020.

GRAPH 22: TOTAL PAYROLL COMPOSITION PER STATE




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL).

GRAPH 23: ANNUAL WAGE MASS VARIATION PER STATE (MILLIONS OF PESOS 2010'S FIRST QUARTER)




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL).

GRAPH 24: PER CAPITA LABOR INCOME




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL). Due to the sanitary crisis, there's no data for the second quarter of 2020.

GRAPH 25: POPULATION PERCENTAGE WITH LABOR INCOME LOWER THAN THE COST OF THE FOOD BASKET, PER STATE




Source: In-house elaboration with information from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL).

GRAPH 26: PRIVATE INTAKE OF THE INTERIOR MARKET MONTHLY INDICATOR (IMCPMI), PER ORIGIN 2013=100
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED SERIES




Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI.b


**GRAPH 29: PRIVATE AGGREGATE AND CONSUMPTION THROUGH CARDS QUARTER BY QUARTER VARIATIONS
(DEBIT & CREDIT) (2013=100)**



Source: In-house elaboration with data from INEGI y del Economic System of Information (SIE) from the Mexican Bank (Banxico).




Source: In-house elaboration with data from The Survey on the Economic Impact Generated by Covid-19 on Enterprise (ECOVIED-IE) 2020.




Source: Elaboración propia con información de la Encuesta Telefónica sobre Covid-19 y Mercado Laboral (ECOVID-ML).


GRAPH 32: FISCAL RESPONSE TOWARD THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN SELECTED ECONOMIES
(DECEMBER 31ST, 2020) (GDP PERCENTAGE)




Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, International Monetary Fund (IMF).




Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Bank of Mexico (Banxico)



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Economic and Ecological Accounts of Mexico (INEGI k).




Source: National Development Plan 2019-2024




Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Energy Information System (SIE by its acronym in Spanish).

GRAPH 47: CRUDE OIL EXPORTS AND REFINING




Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Energy Information System (SIE).

**GRAPH 51: COMPANIES WITH EQUIPMENT FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
PARTICIPATION IN RESPECT TO THE TOTAL BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (%)**




Source: In-house elaboration with data from Economic Census 2019. (INEGI a)

GRAPH 52: PARTICIPATION IN THE TOTAL GROSS PRODUCT OF THE COMPANIES THAT HAVE EQUIPMENT FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION (%)



Source: In-house elaboration with data from Economic Census 2019. (INEGI. a)

GRAPH 54: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) FLOW AND ACCUMULATED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS



Source: In-house elaboration with data from the Secretariat of Economy.



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